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AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING & THE ETHICAL TAX
LAWYER
Heather M. Field'
Can a tax planner be both ethical and aggressive? When a client
wants help with a transaction in which the lawyer thinks the tax benefits
will probably not be sustained on the merits if challenged, what is the
ethical response? How low should the tax adviser go? The rules of ethics
and standards of tax practice generally do not answer these questions. And
there is a dearth of guidance about what it means to behave ethically when
making discretionary decisions about when and how to provide advice for
aggressive tax planning. This article fills that gap and argues that a lawyer
seeking to pursue a career as an ethical tax planner should identify and
implement her philosophy of lawyering to help her make these difficult
discretionary decisions in a principled way. Using, as an example, a U.S.
multinational corporation that wants to invert and engage in other
potentially aggressive cross-border tax reduction strategies that Congress
and the Treasury have repeatedly tried to curtail, this article demonstrates
that employing a philosophy of lawyering empowers a tax planner to
determine how (and whether) to assist this client. Ultimately, this article
helps a tax planner operationalize, on an individual basis and in a way that
aligns with her values, both the general and tax-specific rules of
professional conduct so that she can answer the questions posed above.
1 Professor of Law & Eucalyptus Foundation Chair, University of California Hastings
College of the Law. I appreciate the opportunities to present this project at the University of
Pittsburgh Tax Law Workshop, the Spring 2013 NorCal Tax Prof Roundtable, the 2013 Law
& Society Association Annual Meeting, the University of Washington Symposium on Duties
to the Tax System, the Tax Workshop at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, the
University of San Francisco Tax Colloquium, the Pepperdine Law School Tax Colloquium,
the Bion Gregory Lecture at UC Hastings College of the Law, and at the "Advising
Taxpayers in the 21 ' Century: Ethical Challenges" Program at the 2016 AALS Annual
Meeting. I thank all participants for their feedback.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A core function of a tax planning lawyer is to help her client achieve
non-tax economic objectives in a manner that minimizes the client's tax
burden. Sometimes it is reasonably clear that a particular tax minimization
opportunity complies with the law, but sometimes attempts to reduce tax
involve more aggressive positions - positions that are potentially wrong,
positions that the tax authority may want to challenge, and positions where
the asserted tax treatment is likely not the proper analysis under the law.
Can an ethical tax lawyer provide this type of planning advice?
2
This inquiry contemplates a lawyer who wants to advise ethically on
2 This is similar to a tax-planning specific version of the question that Charles Fried
asked in the first line of his article, Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976) ("Can a good
lawyer be a good person?").
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contestable tax positions. She does not think that tax planning is inherently
wrong. 3 She agrees with the notion that "[a]ny one may so arrange his
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose
that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic
duty to increase one's taxes."4 She respects that most of her clients do not
want to take the most conservative (highest tax) approach when arranging
their affairs. And she wants to pursue a career as a tax planner helping
clients to arrange their affairs while reducing their taxes.
Yet she will not assist a client in committing fraud, and she is not
interested in helping a client take advantage of under-enforcement of the tax
law to get away with clear violations of the law.5 She does not want to be a
"sheltering lawyer," 6 like Paul Daugerdas (formerly of Jenkens & Gilchrist)
and Raymond J. ("R.J.") Ruble (formerly of Brown & Wood), both of
whom went to jail for their roles in tax shelters.7 And she does not want to
be part of the next Mossack Fonseca, the law firm at the center of the
Panama Papers scandal.8 Rather, she merely hopes to make a living as a tax
planner, and she wants to do so in a way that maintains her personal
integrity. Ultimately, she is concerned about staying on the right side of the
3 The academic literature is rife with critiques of tax planning, and scholars argue that
tax planning is complex, costly, wasteful, inequitable and, obviously, revenue reducing. See,
e.g., David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1312, 1314 (2001); David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215,
222-25 (2002) (arguing that all tax planning is inefficient and "positively bad for society").
This article sets aside the critiques of tax planning in general and accepts the continuing role
of tax planners. Indeed, a person who believes that tax planning is inherently wrong or who
opposes tax planning because of the deadweight loss that it produces should probably choose
not to be a tax planner, and thus would not be faced with the dilemma addressed by this
article - how to behave ethically while undertaking potentially aggressive tax planning.
4 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
5 See Daniel T. Ostas, Legal Loopholes and Underenforced Laws: Examining the
Ethical Dimensions of Corporate Legal Strategy, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 487,488 (2009).
6 See generally TANINA ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE GAMES:
LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS AND THE TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY 25 (2014); Sheldon Pollack &
Jay A. Soled, Tax Professionals Behaving Badly, 105 TAX NOTES 201, 204 (2004); Tanina
Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE
J. ON REG. 77, 77 (2006).
7 Larry Neumeister, Chicago Lawyer Gets 15 Years in Big Tax Fraud Case, HOUSTON
CHRON., June 26, 2014, at B2 (reporting that Daugerdas was sentenced to 15 years in jail and
was "ordered to pay nearly a half-billion dollars in restitution and forfeit $164 million in
cash and property"); Kara Scannell, How Lawyers Helped Drive the Boom in Tax Shelters,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2004, at Al (describing Ruble's role in promoting tax shelters); Three
Tied to KPMG Sentenced, WALL ST. J., April 2, 2009, at C3 (reporting on Ruble's 78-month
sentence).
8 William Hoke, 'John Doe' Explains Reasons for Leaking Panama Papers, 2016
TNT 89-25 (May 9, 2016) (quoting Doe's criticisms of the Panamanian law firm).
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ethical line, wherever that "mythical line" is.
9
So what does it mean to be ethical when providing tax planning advice
on potentially aggressive tax positions?
It clearly requires knowledge of the rules of ethics that govern the
profession, whether those are the Model Rules of Professional Conduct or
the variation thereon that applies in the jurisdiction in which the tax planner
is authorized to practice. The tax planner must also understand the ABA
Formal Opinions relevant to the provision of tax advice l° and the Circular
230 regulations that set out standards of practice for those individuals who
"practice before the IRS," which includes anyone who "render[s] written
advice with respect to any entity, transaction, plan or arrangement, or other
plan or arrangement having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion" (i.e.,
tax planners)." The tax planner must know what actions could subject her
to preparer penalties, particularly if she is likely to render advice both
before and after the transaction.' 2 Further, if the tax planner advises with
respect to reportable transactions, she must be familiar with the disclosure
and list maintenance requirements and with the related penalties. 3  The
foregoing is not easy. Indeed, there is ample literature that discusses the
meaning of both the rules of professional conduct that apply to all lawyers'
4
9 Monte A. Jackel, The Aggressive and the Meek, 137 TAX NOTES 77, 77 (Oct. 1,
2012) (describing as "mythical" that "line between what is legitimate taxpayer behavior and
what is not").
'o See, e.g., ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 366 (1992);
ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 352 (1985), ABA Comm'n on
Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982).
" 31 C.F.R. § 10.2 (2011) (hereinafter "Circular 230"). See generally Linda Galler,
Special Rules for Tax Professionals: Return Preparer Penalties & Ethical Standards, in
NUTS AND BOLTS OF TAX PENALTIES 2016: A PRIMER ON THE STANDARDS, PROCEDURES AND
DEFENSES RELATING TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TAX, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE BASICS, ch. 4
(Bryan C. Skarlatos, chair, 2016) (discussing the Circular 230 rules). Circular 230's impact
has been reduced by recent cases, making tax advising slightly more of a self-regulated
practice. See Dennis Drapkin, Loving and Ridgely: Implications for Practitioners, 148 TAX
NOTES 319, 319 (July 20, 2015). This means that it is even more important than ever for
individual tax advisers to do what is recommended by this article - to develop and
implement a lawyering philosophy to guide their ethical practice.
12 I.R.C. §§ 6694, 7701(a)(36). See Kip Dellinger, Tax Advice: A Toolkit, 149 TAX
NOTES 819 (Nov. 9, 2015) ("Tax planning advice is not necessarily subject to the preparer
penalty provisions of the Internal Revenue Code if it is provided in the form of pre-
transaction planning-unless the tax adviser reconfirms the advice in the return filing
position or spends more than 5 percent of the total time involved in furnishing the advice on
post-transaction services."); see generally NUTS & BOLTS, supra note 11, at ch. 1-4.
13 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6111, 6112, 6700, 6701, 6707A. See generally Megan L.
Brackney, Reportable Transaction Penalties, in NUTS & BOLTS, supra note 11, at ch. 5.
14 See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING (4th ed. 2015).
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and the specific rules that regulate tax practice.'
5
Understanding these rules is necessary, but it is not sufficient because
these rules leave many questions unanswered. The rules and standards do
set some clear boundaries-for example, an ethical tax planner must be
truthful, and she cannot help a client commit tax fraud.16 But the authorities
regulating the profession leave tax planners with a tremendous amount of
discretion on questions such as the following: 17 Which matters will the
lawyer agree to take on (and why)? How aggressive is the lawyer willing to
be within the boundaries of what is allowed? Should the lawyer-client
relationship be one where the lawyer does what the client requests or should
(and in what circumstances should) the lawyer try to persuade the client to
do something else? Should the lawyer consider only the client's interests
when advising the client or should the lawyer also consider interests of
others? 8
Of course, ethical practice is not merely "a matter of individual
conscience and therefore individual choice."' 9 Within the boundaries of the
rules, however, there are many choices that individual practitioners must
make. These issues of discretion and judgment are important in a wide
variety of practice areas. And although scholars have discussed these
questions extensively, there is no consensus about the answers. 2 1 Further,
15 See, e.g., LINDA GALLER & MICHAEL B. LANG, REGULATION OF TAX PRACTICE
(2010); NUTS & BOLTS, supra note 11; DONALD B. TOBIN ET AL., PROBLEMS IN TAX ETHICS
(2009); BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (4th ed.
2008).
16 See ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 366 (1992); ABA
Comm'n on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 352 (1985).
17 See Nathan M. Crystal, Developing a Philosophy of Lawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 75, 77-83 (2000) [hereinafter Crystal, Philosophy] (discussing the
range of discretionary decisions faced by practicing lawyers); Robert W. Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 26-30 (1988) (discussing lawyers' options
when exercising discretion about how to counsel a client about compliance); William H.
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988) (arguing that
"lawyers should exercise judgment and discretion in deciding what clients to represent and
how to represent them .... [and that when] exercising this discretion, lawyers should seek to
'do justice."').
18 The model rules generally allow discretion about the scope of issues considered
when a lawyer advises a client, but this leaves to the lawyer's discretion the degree to which
the lawyer takes these issues into account. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM.
BAR. ASS'N 2016).
19 Frederic G. Corneel, Ethical Guidelines for Tax Practice, 28 TAX L. REV. 1, 1
(1970).
20 See, e.g., HAZARD, supra note 14; DAVID LUBAN ED., THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS'
ROLES & LAWYERS' ETHICS (1984); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:
REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 58 (2000); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN,
JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed., 2009); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE
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the literature has not effectively engaged these issues in the context of tax
planning .22
This gap is glaring because these issues involving exercise of discretion
and judgment are particularly important and challenging in the context of
tax practice. This is for several reasons. First, tax planners are subject not
only to the general rules of professional responsibility that apply to all
lawyers, but are also subject to an additional set of tax-specific ethical rules,
making the exercise of discretion more complex and fraught with
minefields in the tax context. Second, both tax planning practice and the
rules articulating the standards of practice for tax lawyers place a very
heavy emphasis on the lawyer's degree of confidence in the strength of a
client's position, thereby elevating the importance of the tax lawyer's
judgment. Third, the tax-specific ethics rules and standards explicitly allow
tax advisers to help clients take positions that are likely to be wrong (i.e.,
that are not more likely than not to be sustained on the merits if challenged).
As a result, tax planners must determine whether and to what extent they
are willing to assist on such matters. Fourth, tax practitioners have played a
key role in tax-sheltering activities that have generated much public scorn,
meaning that tax advisers have not always exercised their discretion in a
way that comports with the public's view of right and wrong. Fifth, the IRS
only audits a small percentage of taxpayers and is thus a weak enforcement
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998); W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS & FIDELITY TO LAW (2010);
Gordon, supra note 17; Thomas D. Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 FLA.
L. REV. 439 (1990); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in
the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995) ) [hereinafter Pepper,
Counseling]; Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986)) [hereinafter Pepper, Amoral];
Deborah Rhode, Ethical Perspectives in Law Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985); Murray
L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669
(1978); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wisc. L. REV. 29 (1978); Simon, supra note 17; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers
as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).
21 See, e.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 20 (presenting very different possible
lawyering approaches); Crystal, Philosophy, supra note 17, at 76 (explaining that "[t]he
discretionary nature of practice demands that lawyers adopt a philosophy of lawyering[, y]et
the lack of professional consensus means that lawyers receive little guidance about how to
go about developing such a philosophy.").
22 There is some literature on tax lawyering, but the discourse on tax professionalism
and ethics has not effectively leveraged the huge literature on lawyering in general.
Although tax shelter planning examples are "discussed regularly in legal ethics literature, but
the responses to [these examples] have been somewhat unsatisfactory." W. Bradley Wendel,
Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 397 (2004). But see W. Bradley Wendel,
Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1167 (2005) (using tax shelters as an
example when developing an argument about a theory of professionalism).
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body, and tax compliance generally cannot be enforced through private
rights of action. As a result, much depends on taxpayer self-reporting.
This, in turn, makes the tax lawyer's advice particularly significant because
24of its strong influence on taxpayer behavior.
So how should a tax planner, who wants to engage in "permissible tax
,,25planning" but not cross the line over into "unethical loophole lawyering,
exercise her discretion and judgment? This article argues that a lawyer
seeking to pursue a career as an ethical tax planner should identify and
implement her philosophy of lawyering to help her make difficult
discretionary tax advising decisions in a principled way, and when
implementing that approach to tax lawyering, she should work to counteract
the subtle factors that can skew her professional judgment.
This article focuses on the role of the individual, and how each
individual tax lawyer should make difficult discretionary decisions within
the existing boundaries of what is arguably allowable. By using the
example of a U.S. multinational corporation that wants to invert and engage
in other cross-border tax minimization strategies that Congress and the
Treasury have tried to curtail, and by drawing on both the extensive
literature on lawyering and professionalism and on social science literature
about factors that lead to skewed decision-making, this article helps each
tax planner operationalize, on an individual basis and in a way that aligns
with her values, both the general and tax-specific rules of professional
conduct.
This article contributes to the literature in three key ways. First, it
focuses on the questions that the existing rules leave to the discretion of
each tax practitioner, rather than helping tax advisers grapple with issues
26that the rules address. Second, it approaches the discussion from an
27individual lawyering perspective, rather than from a policymaking
23 These are also features, at least to some degree, of other regulatory regimes. Thus,
the discussion herein could be generalized to aggressive lawyering in those other regulatory
regimes, to the extent that the planning lawyers in those regimes serve similar roles as tax
planners. However, as mentioned in the text, there are multiple things that are unique about
aggressive lawyering in tax, including the presence of a whole set of tax-specific ethical
rules.
24 See Ken Devos, An Investigation into the Ethical Views and Opinions of Australian
Tax Practitioners of Different Affiliations, 20 N.Z. J. TAX LAw & POL'Y 169 (2014) ("[T]ax
practitioners are viewed as the link between both the taxpayer and the revenue agency.").
25 Wendel, Civil Obedience, supra note 22, at 399.
26 Ample resources help tax advisers determine how to comply with the rules. See
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
27 There is some literature on how to give tax advice, but this literature is not enough
to help the tax adviser figure out how to approach the role of tax advising or determine how
to advise a client when faced with a difficult discretionary decision. See, e.g., Dellinger,
supra note 12, at 819; see also Frederic G. Corneel, Guidelines to Tax Practice Second, 43
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28perspective. Third, it provides actionable guidance to tax professionals
about how to regulate their own behavior, rather than merely lamenting the
29decline in the professionalism of the tax bar and telling cautionary tales .
Notably, this article does not advocate for one particular lawyering
approach for individual tax planners. Rather, it presents a framework -
with options, examples, and factors that would suggest different approaches
- that each lawyer can use to identify and implement an approach to tax
planning in potentially aggressive situations and in a way that aligns with
her values.
The article proceeds as follows.
Part II provides background on the unique context for giving tax
planning advice by (a) explaining tax opinions, which are a critical part of
tax planning advice especially for aggressive positions, and (b) providing,
as an example of potentially aggressive tax planning, a situation in which a
lawyer is asked to help a U.S. multinational corporation reduce its U.S. tax
burden through an inversion and other cross-border tax reduction strategies.
Part III explores different philosophies of lawyering and explains how
each philosophy would alter what the tax adviser would (and would not) be
willing to do to assist the U.S. multinational corporation with its potentially
aggressive tax planning.
Part IV argues that selecting and implementing a lawyering philosophy
increases the likelihood a tax planner will behave in an ethical manner, even
in the context of aggressive planning.
TAX LAW. 297 (1990) (discussing guidelines for implementing the ethical rules).
28 There is also ample literature making recommendations about how the tax-related
ethics rules (or their application) should be improved. See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice
Before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges, 25
VA. TAX REV. 583 (2006) (arguing that a "taxpayer should not be able to take a position on a
tax return, nor an advisor advise a position, unless it is considered to have a greater than fifty
percent likelihood of success on the merits if litigated."); John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J.
Peroni, The Decline in Tax Adviser Professionalism in American Society, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2721 (2016) (arguing for "several changes that would delineate more clearly the tax
professionals' duty to the system"); David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAx. L.
REV. 331 (2006) (arguing that changing tax-specific ethical rules applicable to lawyers can
curtail tax shelter activity).
29 The existing literature, while valuable, generally does not provide guidance about
how individuals can avoid this lamentable behavior. See, e.g., Anthony C. Infanti, Eyes
Wide Shut: Surveying Erosion in the Professionalism of the Tax Bar, 22 VA. TAX REV. 589,
614 (2003) (ably "providing concrete evidence of an erosion in the professionalism of the tax
bar"); Pollack & Soled, supra note 6. Michael Hatfield provides historical perspective about
how attitudes towards the role and philosophy of the community of tax lawyers have evolved
over time. Michael Hatfield, Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945-1965: Patriotism,
Duties, and Advice, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2012); Michael Hatfield, Committee Opinions and
Treasury Regulation: Tax Lawyer Ethics, 1965-1985, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 675 (2014).
2017]
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Part V helps tax planners select a lawyering philosophy by examining
issues unique to tax planning that are likely to affect a tax planner's choice.
Part VI addresses implementation by identifying major impediments to
effectuating one's chosen tax planning philosophy and by making
recommendations about how to overcome these barriers.
Part VII concludes.
Ultimately, this article argues that an important part of being an ethical
tax planner, particularly when dealing with contestable tax positions,
includes both being deliberate about how one approaches the task of giving
tax planning advice and being self-aware about the ways in which one
exercises judgment. Given that the collective ethics of the tax planning
profession reflect the sum of the choices made by individual practitioners,
perhaps this article's guidance about the ethics of the tax planning can
empower tax advisers to make better decisions about how they approach
potentially aggressive tax planning. This, in turn, can strengthen the
professionalism of the tax bar and help to rehabilitate the public image of
tax lawyers.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE TAX PLANNING CONTEXT
An analysis of what it means to be ethical while assisting with
potentially aggressive tax planning requires an understanding of the unique
context for giving tax planning advice. Thus, this section provides two
pieces of background. First, it explains tax opinion practice and why a tax
adviser's opinion about the likelihood that a position will succeed on the
merits if challenged is such a critical part of (potentially) aggressive tax
planning. Second, it provides a tax planning example-where a lawyer has
been asked to assist a U.S. multinational corporation reduce its U.S. tax
burden through an inversion and other cross-border tax minimization
strategies-to help illustrate a lawyer's role (and options) in potentially
aggressive tax planning.
A. Tax Opinion Practice
All tax planning advice requires the adviser to assess the strength of a
tax position that the client might adopt. The key judgment call that any tax
planner must make is to determine the likelihood that a proposed position
would succeed on the merits if challenged. The tax adviser's judgment on
this issue is often reflected in a written tax opinion that the tax adviser
renders to the client and on which the client and sometimes others rely. Tax
opinions are common not only in tax shelter transactions, but in many other
contexts, including most tax-intensive transactions (e.g., tax-free
[Vol. 36:261
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reorganizations, financial instrument issuances) by public companies. 30
Even if the lawyer's judgment about the strength of the position is not
memorialized in a written tax opinion, this judgment is typically conveyed
to the client in order to help the client assess whether it wants to proceed
with the proposed course of action.
1. Opinion Levels
Typical opinion thresholds include,31 in declining order of strength:
"will," "should," "more likely than not, 32 "substantial authority, 33 and
"reasonable basis. 34 An opinion might also be given at a "not frivolous"
level .35 These are terms of art in tax practice. However, different levels of
certainty are hard to quantify, and experts disagree as to the exact numbers.
Rough approximations of the likelihood of success on the merits of the key




More Likely Than Not - >50%
Substantial Authority - 35%-40%
Reasonable Basis - 20-25%
Not Frivolous - 5-10%
Tax opinions are generally subject to many caveats and the level of
certainty is sometimes qualified with phrases such as "although not free
from doubt." Thus, there is almost a continuum of certainty thresholds, and
people sometimes refer to "strong" and "weak" versions of the certainty
levels.37 This means that any errors in judgment could move the opinion
standard slightly up or slightly down, perhaps turning a "more likely than
not" opinion into a "weak should" opinion.
2. Consequences of Opinion Levels
For aggressive positions, a position's likelihood of success on the
merits is important for purposes of potential penalties to which the taxpayer
30 See Robert P. Rothman, Tax Opinion Practice, 64 TAx LAW. 301 (2011).
31 See GALLER & LANG, supra note 15, at 98-101.
32 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-4(d)(2), 1.6664-4(f)(2)(B)(2) (2016).
"3 Id. at § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (2016).
34 Id. at § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2016).
" Id. at § 1.6694-2(c)(2) (2016).
36 See Rothman, supra note 30, at 312-27; GALLER & LANG, supra note 15, at 98-101.
37 See Anonymous, A Detailed Guide to Tax Opinion Standards, 106 TAx NOTES 1469
(Mar. 21,2005) (mocking the continuum of tax opinion thresholds).
2017]
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could be subject. 38 For example, a taxpayer will generally be able to avoid
penalties for substantial understatement of tax if there was substantial
authority for the position or if the taxpayer disclosed the position and there
was reasonable basis for the position.39 For understatements with respect to
particularly suspect transactions (generally referred to as a "tax shelter" or a
"listed" or "reportable" transaction), 40 the threshold is higher; avoidance of
understatement penalties requires, among other things, disclosure,
substantial authority for the position, and that the "taxpayer reasonably
believed that such treatment was more likely than not the proper
treatment.' One way for a taxpayer to try to establish that the taxpayer
had that "reasonable belief' is to demonstrate that the taxpayer "reasonably
relie[d] in good faith on the opinion of a professional tax advisor [at a
"more likely than not" level of confidence] . And for other
underpayments, including certain valuation-related underpayments, a
38 See Rothman, supra note 30, at 389-403 (discussing the relevance of tax adviser
opinions to the imposition of accuracy related penalties, substantial valuation misstatement
penalties, the reasonable cause/good faith defense to penalties, and to penalties relating to
reportable transactions). For penalty protection purposes, the substantive analysis of the
strength of the position is at least as important as the actual opinion articulating the
assessment. This is because when arguing for a reduction of accuracy-related penalties due
to, for example, substantial authority, a taxpayer's ability to make the substantive case that
there was substantial authority for the position is what is critical; it is not enough for the
taxpayer to have an opinion in which an adviser says that she believes that there is
substantial authority. I.R.C. § 6662(2)(B)(i); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d) (2016)
("Conclusions reached in treatises, legal periodicals, legal opinions or opinions rendered by
tax professionals are not authority. The authorities underlying such expressions of opinion
where applicable to the facts of a particular case, however, may give rise to substantial
authority for the tax treatment of an item."). A taxpayer can also argue for a penalty
reduction on the grounds that he reasonably relied in good faith on an adviser's opinion, but
there are limits on the taxpayer's ability to rely on opinions. See Treas. Reg. 1.6664-4(c)
(2016). That said, with the revision to the Circular 230 rules that eliminated the rules
regarding "covered opinions," it is now easier to give an opinion that a taxpayer could use to
assist with penalty protection. See T.D. 9668, 2014-27 I.R.B. 1 (eliminating the covered
opinion rules in former Circular 230 §10.35, and revising Circular 230 §10.37 re: written
advice).
" I.R.C. §§ 6662(d)(2)(B), 6694(a)(2)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d) (2016) (defining
"substantial authority" as "an objective standard involving an analysis of the law and
application of the law to relevant facts." The substantial authority standard is less stringent
than the more likely than not standard (the standard that is met when there is a greater than
50-percent likelihood of the position being upheld), but more stringent than the reasonable
basis standard as defined in § 1.6662-3(b)(3)."); Treas. Reg. §1.6662-3(b)(3) (2016)
(defining "reasonable basis"). The underpayment penalties for substantial valuation
misstatement are separate. I.R.C. § 6662(e).
40 I.R.C. §§ 6662(d)(2)(C), 6662A(b)(2), 6707A.
41 Id. at §§ 6662A, 6664(d)(3).
42 Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(2) (2016).
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taxpayer can reduce or eliminate penalties if the taxpayer acted with
reasonable cause and in good faith.43 Reliance on professional advice can
be a factor in determining whether the taxpayer meets the reasonable
cause/good faith standard.44
The determination of a position's likelihood of success on the merits
also affects the tax advisor directly. Penalties can apply to the tax adviser
in addition to the taxpayer, and there are similar thresholds to those
discussed above that can allow a tax adviser to avoid penalties if there was
sufficient authority for the position that led to the underpayment.4 5  In
addition, the standards of practice articulated in Circular 230 prohibit tax
advisers from advising a client to take a reporting position unless either (1)
there is substantial authority for the position, or (2) there is a reasonable
basis and proper disclosure is made; in the case of a tax shelter or reportable
transaction, Circular 230 prohibits a tax adviser from advising a client to
take a reporting position unless "it is reasonable to believe that the position
would more likely than not be sustained on its merits. 4 6  Violation of
Circular 230 can, among other things, adversely affect a tax adviser's
ability to continue to practice.47
Thus, a tax adviser's assessment of the strength of a position is
critically important as part of the tax planning process.4 8 Of course, the
ultimate determination of whether any sanctions will be imposed depends
not on the tax planner's assessment of the likelihood of success on the
merits, but rather on the Service's and/or court's adjudication of the
strength of the position. If a tax planner advises a client that there is
substantial authority for a position so that the client can take that position
without disclosure, but the IRS/courts ultimately determine that substantial
authority was lacking, then the taxpayer may be subject to an accuracy-
related penalty that she did not anticipate, 49 and the advisor might suffer
penalties too. 50 Thus, it is critical for the advisor's professional judgment
about the strength of a position to be as close as possible to the "actual"
41 I.R.C. § 6664(c).
44 Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c) (2016).
41 I.R.C. § 6694.
46 Circular 230 § 10.34(a)(1)(ii)(B) (2014).
41 Id. at §§ 10.50, 10.52.
48 A tremendous amount of work typically goes into the analytical process; it is critical
that the tax adviser's determination is not merely based on her "gut." See Dennis J. Ventry,
Jr. & Bradley T. Borden, Probability, Professionalism, & Protecting Taxpayers, 68 TAX
LAW. 83, 96 (2014) (explaining how these standards of care reflected in opinion thresholds
"helps practitioners render accurate advice while also helping taxpayers report accurate
returns").
49 I.R.C. § 6662(a)-(b).
" Id. at § 6694(a)(3) (subject to reasonable cause exception).
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strength of the position as it would be determined in a final adjudication.5 1
Even for more conservative positions, tax planners often need to make
assessments of a position's likelihood of success on the merits. This arises
commonly in opinion practice, where the lawyer must distinguish between
"will," "should," and "more-likely-than-not" level certainty. The "will" and
"should" levels are not concepts derived from the statute, and they are not
accompanied by the same penalty risks as the lower levels of certainty .
Nevertheless, the difference between these certainty thresholds can be
important to clients because, for example, some clients need high-certainty
legal opinions to help attract investors (and to do so at favorable prices),53
to enable them to close transactions,54 to meet federal securities laws, or for
55
accounting purposes.
B. An Example: Tax Planning for U.S. Multi-National Corporations
An example of a situation in which a tax adviser may be asked to opine
about the efficacy of tax planning strategies is in the context of advising a
multi-national corporation (an "MNC") that is seeking to minimize its tax
burden. This provides a good example for illustrating the impact of
different lawyering philosophies because the tax planning strategies range
from very conservative to quite aggressive, meriting very different types of
opinions; because there is a quite a bit of controversy surrounding the
propriety of the use of these strategies with people having dramatically
different views about the "right" thing to do;56 because recent high-profile
5 That is, we should not try to judge a lawyer's judgment against the "right" answer as
would be determined by an omniscient and infallible being. Indeed, neither the Service nor
the court is omniscient, and neither is infallible. Thus, we measure a lawyer's judgment
against the determination that the Service and courts would make in the particular facts and
circumstances.
52 Rothman, supra note 30, at 311-12.
53 For example, in an issuance of a financial instrument that is intended to be treated as
debt for federal income tax purposes, as the strength of the opinion about whether the
instrument will be treated as debt declines, the risk associated with the transaction increases
(e.g., because there is an increasing chance that the interest paid will not be deductible), and
the higher the interest rate that will likely need to be offered to investors in order to place all
of the debt.
54 For tax-free reorganizations involving public companies, the industry standard is for
there to be a "will" opinion; opinions given at lower levels of certainty can imperil a
transaction.
55 See Rothman, supra note 30, at 308-10.
56 See generally Steven Davidoff Solomon, Corporate Inversions Aren't the Half of It,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2016, at B5 ("[T]he corporate runaways [engaging in inversions and
earnings stripping] are winning - winning no good-American awards, but taking easy
money out of the pockets of the United States taxpayer."); Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President on the Economy, WHITE HoUSE (July 24, 2014, 1:15 PM) https://www.whitehouse.
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transactions 57 have thrust tax planners into the spotlight for their role in
helping clients use these strategies to avoid taxes; 58 because there are U.S.
59
and international efforts underway to reduce the opportunities for such tax
planning; 60 and because the deployment of such strategies may or may not
be driven primarily by tax minimization motives.61 As a result of the
gov/the-press-office/2014/07/24/remarks-president-economy-los-angeles-ca (calling the
ability to invert an "unpatriotic tax loophole"). But see Michael J. de la Merced et al., Pfizer
Chief Defends Merger With Allergan as Good for U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2015 (Pfizer's
CEO explaining that the transaction "was actually good for the United States" because it
would "give [Pfizer] more cash that it could invest in the United States and ultimately add
jobs"); Doron Narotzki, The True Economic Effects of Corporate Inversions, 151 TAX
NOTES 1819, 1819 (June 27, 2016) (using data from recent inversions to argue that
"corporate inversions are not necessarily as harmful as they are portrayed to be" and that "as
a result of these [inversion] transactions, business value increases, jobs are created, and...
more earnings are repatriated to the United States.").
57 See, e.g., Andrew Velarde, Johnson Controls Goes 'Full Steam Ahead' With Tyco
Inversion, 2016 TNT 78-2 (Apr. 22, 2016) (discussing an inversion that is expected "to
create $150 million in annual tax benefits"); Andrew Velarde, U.S. Treasury Finally KOs
Pfizer Inversion, TAX NOTES INT'L, Apr. 11, 2016, at 145 (reporting that Pfizer and Allergan
called off their planned $160 billion inversion deal); see also MARPLES & GRAVELLE, infra
note 63, at 11- 12 (identifying several additional very recent inversion transactions).
58 See, e.g., Liz Hoffman, At Skadden, Tax Law Isn't So Boring as Inversions Raise the
Stakes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2015 ("Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew blamed 'creative
accountants and lawyers' for helping U.S. companies sidestep taxes."); Zachary R. Mider,
Tax Inversions Succeed When Government Lawyers Go Private, BLOOMBERG Bus. (Oct. 24,
2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-27/tax-inversions-succeed-when-
government-lawyers-go-private.
59 In April 2016, the Treasury published temporary regulations intended to limit
inversions and published proposed regulations addressing earnings stripping transactions
often undertaken in connection with inversions. T.D. 9761, 2016-20 IRB 743; Treatment of
Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or Indebtedness, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912 (proposed
Apr. 4, 2016) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1 to -4). Parts of these regulations were
finalized in October 2016, and parts of these regulations were revised and issued as
temporary (and proposed). T.D. 9790, 2016-45 I.R.B. 540. See also, e.g., Protecting the
U.S. Corporate Tax Base Act of 2016, H.R. 5261, 114th Cong. (2016); 'Stop Corporate
Inversions Act of 2014, H.R. 4679, 113th Cong. (2014).
60 See generally Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD, www.oecd.org/tax/beps.htm
(last visited Feb. 26, 2016); Jeffrey M. Kadet, BEPS: A Primer on Where It Came From and
Where It's Going, 150 TAX NOTES 793,793 (Feb. 15,2016); Catherine G. Schultz, Update on
OECD BEPS Project, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE BASICS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
2015, 561 (2015) (discussing the content and status of the OECD's efforts to curtail base
erosion and profit shifting, and providing "insight into the potential impacts of the BEPS
Project on U.S. multinationals").
61 See Narotzki, supra note 56, at 1829. (arguing that the "data presented in this report
indicate that there are strong, nontax business reasons to participate in corporate
inversions").
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foregoing, an adviser's lawyering approach can dramatically affect whether
and how a client pursues these strategies.
This section will provide a brief introduction to the following MNC tax
minimization strategies: inversions, earnings stripping, and aggressive
transfer pricing for intangibles. 62  Then, the next section will identify
different philosophies of tax planning and explain how tax planners would
respond to being asked to assist an MNC in utilizing one or more of these
strategies.
Readers familiar with these MNC tax minimization strategies may
want to skip directly to the next section.
1. Inversions
One technique for reducing the U.S. tax burden of a U.S.-parented
MNC is for the corporation to invert so that the parent company is a foreign
corporation rather than a U.S. corporation. 63  The tax benefits of this
transaction have come primarily from the ability to avoid U.S. taxation on
future earnings from foreign subsidiaries; 64 "the ability to use intercompany
borrowing (or intangible licenses) from a foreign affiliate to generate
earnings-stripping payments from the U.S. corporate tax base; the use,
directly or indirectly, of a U.S. group's unrepatriated foreign earnings for
the benefit of U.S. shareholder of the foreign parent corporation [e.g.,
through "hopscotch loans"]; [and] the ability to sell U.S.-located inventory
into the U.S. market without U.S. tax."
65
62 There are other tax minimization strategies for MNCs, such as the use of hybrid
entities and strategies involving foreign tax credits. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 14-
16 (2015). However, the three strategies discussed in the text are among the most high-
profile and costly. Id. at 22-23.
63 See generally DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43568, CORPORATE EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES (2016)
(providing background relating to the tax issues for inversions); Michael Schultz, Inversions,
Outbound Transfers of Business Assets and Expatriation Consequences, in PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE BASICS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 2015,273 (2015).
64 The U.S. generally taxes the worldwide income of U.S. corporations, subject to a
regime that allows for the deferral of taxation on some earnings of foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. corporations. Thus, an inversion removes part of the MNC's operations out from under
the U.S. corporation (or at least provides the MNC an opportunity to structure future foreign
business activity through foreign subsidiaries owned by a foreign parent), reducing the U.S.
income tax owed on the earnings of those foreign operations.
65 Stephen E. Shay et al., Treasury's Unfinished Work on Corporate Expatriations,
150 TAX NOTES 933, 935 (Feb. 22, 2016). Earnings stripping will be discussed below in Part
II.B.2.
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Congress enacted anti-inversion provisions in 200466 that generally
treat the inverted foreign parent corporation as a U.S. corporation -
thereby eliminating the tax benefits of the inversion - if at least 80% of the
new foreign parent's stock is owned by the former domestic parent's
shareholders. 67 A lesser, but still significant, tax cost is imposed if there is
between 60% and 80% continuity in the shareholders. 68 These rules are
subject to an exception if there is substantial business activity in the foreign
country. 69 The Treasury issued regulations in 2012,70 notices in 201471 and
2015,72 and additional temporary, proposed, and final regulations in 2016, 73
all further limiting inversions and their benefits. In addition, more action
on inversions may be forthcoming under the new presidential
administration, although this action may focus on disincentivizing
inversions through fundamental changes to the U.S. tax regime rather than
on curtailing inversions through specific legislation or regulations.74 Even
with the recent regulations (assuming that they withstand the recent legal
66 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
67 I.R.C. § 7874(b).
68 Id. at § 7874(a).
69 Id. at § 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii).
70 T.D. 9592, 2012-28 I.R.B. 41 (increasing the threshold for the safe harbor for the
substantial business activities test, which enables an inversion to avoid the adverse impact of
Section 7874, from 10% to 25%, thereby making it harder for an inversion to meet the
requirements for this exception).
71 IRS Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712 (limiting techniques to avoid having 80%
shareholder continuity in an inversion so as to qualify for some tax benefits from inverting,
and limiting tax-favorable post-inversion planning techniques, such as accessing the earnings
of foreign subsidiaries of the former U.S. parent).
72 IRS Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775 (imposing additional, but more limited,
restrictions on inversions).
7' T.D. 9761, 2016-20 I.R.B. 743 (issuing temporary regulations implementing
provisions articulated in the 2014 and 2015 notices and adding additional restrictions on
inversions, including rules limiting serial and multi-step inversions); T.D. 9761, 2016-20
IRB 743 (issuing proposed regulations under I.R.C. 385 in April 2016); T.D. 9790, 2016-45
I.R.B. 540 (following up T.D. 9761 with further action, issuing temporary and final
regulations under I.R.C. 385 in October 2016 addressing debt/equity characterization and
limiting opportunities for earnings stripping).
74 See, e.g., Donald J. Trump, An America First Economic Plan: Winning the Global
Competition, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/an-america-first-economic-plan-
winning-the-global-competition (last visited Dec. 5, 2016) ("Our lower business tax will also
end job-killing corporate inversions, and cause trillions in new dollars and wealth to come
pouring into our country"); see also Mindy Herzfeld, News Analysis: What's on Trump's
International Tax Agenda?, 2016 WORLD TAX DAILY 220-1 (Nov. 14, 2016) (discussing
President-elect Trump's possible approach to inversions).
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challenge to their validity), 75 there remain opportunities for U.S. MNCs to
obtain tax benefits from inverting if they can navigate the restrictions.
Thus, U.S. MNCs could benefit from tax planning advice that would
help ensure that there is sufficient foreign business activity or that the
original U.S. shareholders own less than 80% (or, better, 60%) of the
foreign parent post-inversion. Some strategies for achieving these goals are
more aggressive than others. The most defensible strategy (given existing
law, which could change, possibly with retroactive impact) for achieving
one or both of these goals would be for a firm to invert by merging with a
pre-existing foreign corporation (rather than by doing a "naked" inversion
whereby a single U.S. MNC reshuffles its corporate structure) 76 where the
pre-existing foreign entity is large enough (and has enough nonpassive
assets) to enable the shareholders of the former U.S. parent to own less than
80% of the foreign parent after the transaction.77
2. Earnings Stripping
Another strategy for reducing U.S. taxation of MNCs is earnings
stripping, meaning the allocation of debt or other expenses to the U.S. entity
in order to increase deductions for the U.S. entity, while shifting income
allocated to a foreign entity that is not subject to U.S. taxation (either
78currently or at all). This strategy can be used either alone or in
conjunction with an inversion.
Recent regulations may curtail this by preventing some intercompany
debt of MNCs from being treated as debt (and thus, from generating interest
deductions). 79  Further, for U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents, thin-
75 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Texas Association of Business are
challenging the validity of the 2016 temporary anti-inversion regulations. The complainants
argue that the regulations were issued in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Business Groups File Suit Challenging Validity of U.S. Inversion Rule, 2016 WORLD. TAX
DAILY 151-23 (Aug. 4, 2016) (publishing the complaint); see also Andrew Velarde,
Chamber of Commerce Files Suit Challenging U.S. Inversion Regs, 83 TAX NOTES INT'L 497
(Aug. 8,2016).
76 See MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 63, at 9 (noting that "the regulations do not
prevent inversions via merger ... although Treasury has indicated future action in this
area").
77 See id. at 10-13 (discussing this strategy and explaining the limits on this strategy
after the recent Treasury actions on inversions).
78 See GRAVELLE, supra note 62, at 10-12; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
114TH CONG., JCX-51-15 PRESENT LAW & SELECTED POLICY ISSUES IN THE U.S. TAXATION
OF CROSS-BORDER INCOME 57-62 (2015); J. Clifton Fleming et al., Getting Serious About
Cross-Border Earnings Stripping: Establishing an Analytical Framework, 93 N.C. L. REV.
673 (2015).
79 T.D. 9790, 2016-45 I.R.B. 540 (issuing proposed, temporary and final regulations
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capitalization rules limit the extent to which the U.S. entity can deduct
interest.80 However, an advisor can help an MNC maximize the shifting of
interest deductions to the U.S. entity within the boundaries of these rules.
For example, a noninverted foreign-parented MNC can still (for now) use
"hopscotch" loans to access earnings of a CFC without incurring current
U.S. taxation, 8 1 and a U.S.-parented MNC that borrows at the U.S. parent
level and funds subsidiaries with equity may benefit from deferral .82
3. Intangibles & Transfer Pricing
An additional strategy is aggressive transfer pricing in which an
enterprise sets a low price for goods and services sold by affiliates in high-
tax jurisdictions to affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions, or sets high prices for
goods and services purchased by affiliates in high-tax jurisdictions from
affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions.83 This strategy increases costs or lowers
income of the affiliate in the high tax jurisdiction, thereby shifting profits to
the lower tax jurisdiction.
Transfers of intangibles are often part of aggressive transfer pricing
strategies, with businesses developing intellectual property in the U.S.
where the business benefits from deductions and credits associated with the
costs of development and then transferring (or licensing) the IP to a foreign
affiliate for a very low price. 84 There are other strategies (e.g., involving
cost-sharing arrangements where the foreign affiliate contributes a very low
amount as a buy-in payment), but all of the strategies generally involve a
transfer, at a low price, of rights to intellectual property to an affiliate in a
low-tax jurisdiction such that future profits from that intellectual property
can be booked to that low-tax jurisdiction, thereby escaping U.S. taxation.
under I.R.C. 385 regarding debt/equity characterization and limiting opportunities for
earnings stripping).
80 I.R.C. § 163(j); see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 78, at 59-
61.
8' See Andrew Velarde, Treasury Hasn't Ruled Out Inversion Regs Expansion, 2016
TNT 82-3 (Apr. 27, 2016) (acknowledging that, at this point, the rules limiting hopscotch
loans are limited to inverted companies).
82 See GRAVELLE, supra note 62, at 10-11; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra
note 78, at 57-59.
83 See GRAVELLE, supra note 62, at 12-13; see generally Neal M. Kochman & Steven
C. Wrappe, Transfer Pricing and Section 482: An Overview of U.S. Transfer Pricing Rules,
in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, BASICS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 2015 359 (2015).
94 See GRAVELLE, supra note 62, at 12-13; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra
note 78, at 53-55; Kochman & Wrappe, supra note 83 (discussing transfer pricing for
tangible property separately from transfer pricing for intangible property).
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Although there are extensive regulations articulating rules for transfer
pricing and requiring such transactions to meet the arm's length standard,85
they are difficult to enforce because, among other reasons, (a) valuation is
notoriously difficult and (b) advisers can help MNCs identify valuation
experts that support (aggressively) low valuations, prepare documentation
that supports those valuations, and time the transfers to maximize the
shifting of future income.86 When the rules are enforced, however, an
underpayment of tax attributable to a "substantial valuation misstatement"
can trigger additional possible penalties.87
III. APPLYING PHILOSOPHIES OF TAX LAWYERING
A tax adviser can take different approaches to advising and opining on
tax minimization strategies such as the ones discussed above for MNCs.
Although the ethical rules governing all lawyers and the standards of
practice that apply to tax lawyers provide boundaries that constrain lawyer
behavior, many decisions are left to the discretion of the lawyer.
Discretionary questions in the MNC advising context include: Should
she represent the MNC? With which MNC tax reduction strategies will she
assist and opine? How aggressive will she be? To what extent will she
merely take direction from her client and to what extent will she try to
convince the client to take the approach she thinks is right? Will she advise
the MNC to take account of consequences to others? How, if at all, will she
advise the MNC regarding audit risk?
This section argues that having a philosophy of tax lawyering will help
a tax planner answer the above questions.
Thus, this section will briefly describe the lawyering philosophies
commonly discussed in the literature, and for each lawyering philosophy,
this section will explain what the philosophy would mean for the tax
planner who is considering whether and how to assist an MNC with tax
minimization. Although this section applies tax lawyering philosophies to
the MNC tax reduction example, lawyering philosophies are equally
relevant for a wide variety of difficult advising questions with which a tax
planner might be faced. For example, lawyering philosophy is relevant for
a tax lawyer advising on whether an individual should be classified as an
employee or independent contractor for tax purposes, which is a difficult,
85 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (2015); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4 (2011).
86 See Andrew Blair-Stanek, IP Law Solutions to Transfer Pricing Abuse, 143 TAX
NOTES 1537 (June 30, 2014) (citing "leading commentators" who "have declared transfer
pricing enforcement dead and intractable"); see also Brett Wells & Cym Lowell, Tax Base
Erosion: Reformation of Section 482's Arm's-Length Standard, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 737
(2014).
87 I.R.C. § 6662(e).
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but hot, topic in the sharing economy.88
The enormous literature on lawyering and professionalism discusses a
variety of approaches to lawyering, 89 and the below discussion of different
approaches necessarily simplifies the voluminous and nuanced discourse in
order to try to provide a survey of different approaches and explain what
they would mean for a tax planner. While different commentators advocate
for particular perspectives, there appears to be no consensus. Indeed, the
"right" philosophy of lawyering likely depends on the practitioner, the
practice area, the practice setting, and the sophistication and needs of the
particular client. Thus, in tax planning, as in other areas of practice, the
practitioner ought to consider carefully the approach that she takes. Later,
Part V will discuss how a tax planner might select from among these
choices. First, however, this section will survey the options.
A. Tax Lawyer as Hired Gun
1. In General
A lawyer may adopt a "client-centered approach" in which the lawyer
generally implements the action directed by the client. Under this
philosophy, which has been described as "the dominant view," 90 "lawyers
must take any action that will advance the client's interest so long as the
action does not clearly violate a rule of ethics or other law (principle of
professionalism)." 91 In this way, "[t]he lawyer acts as hired gun, acting at
the direction of the boss/client, taking no responsibility for injury to other
people. 92 This approach prioritizes the value of advancing client autonomy
and views the lawyer as instrumental in empowering the client.93 Thus, the
lawyer is "neutral" and "nonjudgmental" of the client's preferences. 94
88 See, e.g., Independent Contractor Misclassification Imposes Huge Costs on Workers
and Federal and State Treasuries, NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, http://nelp.org/content/
uploads/Independent-Contractor-Costs.pdf (last updated July 22, 2015).
89 See supra note 20.
90 Wendel, Civil Obedience, supra note 22, at 368-69.
91 Nathan M. Crystal, Using the Concept of "Philosophy of Lawyering" in Teaching
Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1235, 1241 (2007) [hereinafter Crystal,
Teaching]; see also, e.g., Pepper, Amoral, supra note 20, at 626 ("And if 'the law' is
manipulable and without clear limits on client conduct, that aspect of the law should be
available to the client."); Schwartz, supra note 20 (arguing that lawyers should act as
"zealous advocates" on behalf of their clients).
92 SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 20, at 3; see also O.W. Holmes, Path of the Law,
10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) (reflecting on the law and the role of the lawyer from the
perspective of the "bad man").
93 Pepper, Amoral, supra note 20, at 633.
94 SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 20, at 16-29; see also, e.g., Gerald J. Postema,
20171
Virginia Tax Review
Given the lawyer's deference to the client's "self-rule," the lawyer is "not
morally accountable for any actions that they take on behalf of clients in
their professional role (the principle of nonaccountability)." 95
A hired-gun lawyer does not necessarily help clients pursue aggressive
strategies. Rather, a tax planner adopting a hired-gun, client-centered
approach would seek to effectuate the client's goals, whatever those goals
are.96 That is, the lawyer generally defers to the client about how aggressive
the client wants to be in the client's effort to reduce taxes. Thus, a hired-gun
tax planner representing a client who wants to be conservative in pursuing
tax planning strategies would help the client pursue only those strategies
that the tax planner concludes are more likely than not to succeed on the
merits. On the other hand, if a client wants to minimize his tax burden in
any way possible, then the tax planner would be as aggressive as the
substantive and ethical rules would arguably allow. Indeed, the hired-gun
approach to tax planning arguably "encourages lawyers to find loopholes"
when representing aggressive clients.97 Although a hired-gun lawyer might
assist her client in pursuing aggressive strategies, there are limits; for
example, even a hired-gun tax planner would be precluded from advising a
client to take positions that are illegal or fraudulent.
98
Ultimately, a hired gun's approach is more about facilitating client
autonomy rather than necessarily pushing aggressive tax planning.
99
However, the hired gun approach is often associated with aggressive tax
planning because the tax planner's philosophical approach reflects a
willingness to empower even aggressive taxpayers. 00 Thus, the client-
Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 73 (1980) (explaining the
centrality of neutrality to the "standard conception of the lawyer's role").
95 Crystal, Teaching, supra note 91, at 1241; Pepper, Amoral, supra note 20, at 614
("As long as what lawyer and client do is lawful, it is the client who is morally accountable,
not the lawyer.").
96 SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 20, at 3 ("[T]he client controls the choice; the
lawyer defers to client choice, arguably for the sake of the client's autonomy (self-rule).");
Margaret Ann Wilkinson et al., Mentor, Mercenary or Melding: An Empirical Inquiry into
the Role of the Lawyer, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 373,380 (1996) ("[T]he only responsibility of a
hired gun is to pursue the goals that have been defined by the client alone.").
97 Wendel, Civil Obedience, supra note 22, at 391.
98 See, e.g., Crystal, Philosophy, supra note 17, at 86 (explaining that hired gun
lawyers do "everything possible to enable their clients to prevail ... except to the extent that
rules of professional conduct or legal principles clearly prohibit the lawyer's conduct. ...
Only clear violations of law or rules of ethics, like bribing witnesses, are prohibited.");
Pepper, Counseling, supra note 20, at 1548 ("The [hired gun] lawyer may not become an
active participant in the client's unlawful activity.").
99 See supra note 96.
1oo See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1344 (1995) (explaining that, under the hired gun approach,
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centered, hired-gun approach to lawyering has been criticized by many
commentators, who advocate for alternate approaches.
°10
2. In the U.S. MNC Tax Planning Context
If a hired gun tax planner is approached by a prospective client seeking
aggressive assistance in reducing the U.S. tax burden of a U.S.-parented
MNC, the tax planner would assist the client in pursuing all arguably
allowable options. l °2
This would include (a) helping the U.S. MNC to structure an inversion
via merger (a technique not precluded by the recent authorities, but that
could be targeted by future action) by finding a suitably large foreign
merger partner with sufficient nonpassive assets to avoid the "cash box"
rules; 0 3 (b) identifying the maximum amount of assets that the U.S. MNC
could distribute to its shareholders in order to "skinny down" before the
proposed transaction (thereby increasingly the likelihood that the foreign
merger partner is sufficiently large to enable the transaction to confer the
desired tax benefits); 04 (c) identifying any opportunities to increase the size
of the foreign entity that are arguably allowable under the anti-stuffing
rules; 10 5 and (d) identifying nontax avoidance business purposes for these
transactions.0 6 Further, the hired gun's advice could include putting as
much debt on the U.S. entity as is arguably allowable under the rules and
identifying any other income stripping opportunities that are not precluded
"[cllients and attorneys routinely assume that tax lawyers should help clients circumvent
their tax obligations").
101 See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 20, at 26-76; RHODE, supra note 20.
102 Of course, even when helping the client pursue all arguably allowable options, the
tax planner should not focus solely on the technical analysis under the law; she must also
ensure that she understands the actual substance of the underlying facts to which the law is
being applied. Jeffery M. Kadet & David L. Koontz, Profit-Shifting Structures: Making
Ethical Judgments Objectively, 151 TAx NOTES 1831 (2016).
103 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-7T (2016) (making even more strict the "cash box"
rules in Notice 2014-52).
104 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-10T (2016) (limiting "non-ordinary course
distributions" to curtail the "skinny down" technique).
105 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-4T (2016) (expanding the rules about nonqualified
property).
106 Having a non-tax avoidance business purpose could be relevant for various aspects
of the analysis, including, for example, in the determination of whether property has been
acquired with a principle purpose of avoiding section 7874, such that the property would be
nonqualified property for purposes of the anti-stuffing rule. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-
4T(i)(7)(iv). Cf. Kadet & Koontz, supra note 102 (discussing the importance of deeply
understanding the substance of the transaction, the actual facts, and the real business purpose
for the transaction, rather than merely focusing on technical analyses of the rules, as part of
making a sound analysis of the proposed transaction).
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after the 2016 debt/equity regulations.'0 7 In addition, if the client wanted to
be particularly aggressive on transfer pricing, the hired gun tax planner
would be willing to assist in making the case for potentially very low
valuation for the transfer of assets in order to shift as much income as
possible to the foreign jurisdiction.'0 8 A tax planner might suggest these
aggressive approaches, even though Congress and/or the Treasury may
undertake future action to curtail some of the techniques, possibly with
retroactive effect.'
0 9
When determining what is "arguably allowable," the tax planner would
identify the planning techniques that she believes are likely to be sustained
on the merits if challenged and which are not likely to be sustained on the
merits if challenged." ° She would be willing to assist a client in
undertaking both types (although she would not be likely to assist on
strategies that she concludes constitute illegal tax evasion or fraud)."' For
those strategies that she believes are not likely to be sustained if challenged
(including those inversion and earnings stripping strategies that might be
subject to future Treasury action with retroactive effect), she would identify
the degree of risk associated with the strategy and the adverse consequences
(e.g., interest and penalties) that would likely ensue if the approach is
challenged and not sustained so that the client could make an informed
decision about risk and rewards of pursuing a particular strategy.
When determining what strategies are arguably allowable, the hired
gun tax planner might even consider strategies that are precluded by the
recent regulations (e.g., additional efforts to "skinny down" the U.S. parent,
structuring "hopscotch" loans to enable access to tax-deferred earnings of
foreign subsidiaries of the U.S. parent) if she concludes that there is a
strong enough argument that the regulations are invalid.' 1 3
107 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
'08 See Blair-Stanek, supra note 86 (discussing the strategic procurement and use of
aggressive valuations); see generally supra Part II.B.3 (explaining the valuation strategy and
its benefits),
109 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712 (explicitly stating that the
Treasury might take such actions).
"10 See supra Part II.A. (explaining that, in order to advise clients in planning situations,
tax lawyers generally need to assess the likelihood that a position would succeed on the
merits if challenged).
1 " See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
112 Heather M. Field, Giving Useful Tax Planning Advice, 134 TAx NOTES 1299, 1302-
03 (Mar. 5, 2012) (explaining that the lawyer's role involves advising the client about the
risks and consequences of particular courses of action so that the client can decide how to
proceed).
113 See supra note 75 and accompanying text; Mindy Herzfeld, Challenging U.S. Anti-
Inversion Guidance, 82 TAx NOTES INT'L 627 (May 16, 2016) (explaining how a taxpayer
could challenge the regulations); Kimberly S. Blanchard, Would a Court Uphold the
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The hired gun tax planner would also probably be willing to answer
client questions about the likelihood of audit,' 14 but even the hired-gun tax
planner should not advise a client to take an aggressive position because the
risk of audit is low.1 5 Ultimately, if a client determined, after a cost/benefit
analysis, that it wanted to undertake a nonfrivolous inversion/earnings
stripping/transfer pricing tax minimization strategy that could potentially
subject the client (and even the tax adviser) to penalties, the hired gun tax
planner would likely be willing to assist with those transactions.
B. Tax Lawyer as Guru
1. In General
As an alternative to the hired-gun approach, some commentators
advocate for a philosophy of morality, in which the lawyer is guided by her
moral choices. The "client defers to the lawyer, and the lawyer takes what
he believes to be the right direction: The lawyer is concerned with others
and is concerned that the client do the right thing. The lawyer acts as guru,
making the moral choices for the client."' 6 Under a philosophy of
morality, "lawyers are morally accountable for the actions that they take on
behalf of their clients and must be prepared to defend the morality of what
Application of Notice 2014-52 to Combinations Closed After September 21, 2014?, 44 TAX
MGM'T INT'L J. 203 (April 10, 2015); David S. Miller & Jaincelynne Asamoto Park, IRS
Issues Final and Temporary Debt-Equity Regulations under Section 385, at 14-15 https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2859709 (Oct. 26, 2016) (explaining that
taxpayers might argue that the final and temporary debt-equity regulations exceed the
authority granted by Congress and/or violate U.S. tax treaties with other countries).
114 GALLER & LANG, supra note 15, at 60; Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Morality of Law
Practice, 66 HAST. L.J. 359,374 (2015) (citing Professor Nathan Spaulding who "argues that
a client is entitled, not only to know how to comply with the law, but to a realistic appraisal
of whether that law will actually be enforced .... By implication, Spaulding affirms that it is
not immoral to give advice that could lead a client to pursue a legally wrongful course of
conduct" and arguing that Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) "can [be] properly
interpret[ed] ... as allowing a client to be given a realistic appraisal of legal risk."); Joel S.
Newman, The Audit Lottery: Don't Ask, Don't Tell?, 86 TAX NOTES 1438, 1443 (Mar. 6,
2000) ("It is appropriate for lawyers to inform clients about the audit rate, even if they plan
to take a return position that does not satisfy the realistic possibility standard.").
"5 Circular 230 § 10.37(a) (2014). Circular 230 prohibits this. In the absence of this
prohibition in Circular 230, a hired-gun tax planner would likely be willing to take the audit
risk into account when giving advice, and some have argued that this should be allowed.
This tax planner who advises clients to take audit risk into account when deciding what
positions to take might be more aptly named "lawyer as mafioso." Thanks to Mark Gergen
for this terminology.
116 SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 20, at 3, 30-41.
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they do."'"17 This lawyer is, and should be, driven by her own sense of
morality." 8 This view reflects the notion that personal values must play an
important role in how a lawyer carries out the law and that the common
good must be a key consideration guiding the lawyer's actions.'' 9
As a result, a lawyer adopting a philosophy of morality is likely to
decline matters more frequently than the hired-gun lawyer because the
"lawyer as guru" will not want to represent a client whose objectives are not
in accord with the lawyer's own view of morality. Similarly, this lawyer
may try harder to persuade the client to take an action that the lawyer views
as moral, and this lawyer may withdraw more frequently if she is unable to
120
convince the client to take that moral action.
In tax planning, a philosophy of morality would likely reflect a strong
ideological component. A strongly anti-tax lawyer might support any
position that would reduce the amount of tax the client pays. This moralist
tax planner might try to approach this (potentially extremely) aggressive tax
minimization as a form of civil disobedience. On the other end of the
ideological spectrum is a lawyer who views all tax reduction efforts as
equivalent to tax shelters and thus concludes that all tax planning is morally
repugnant. This lawyer, if adopting a philosophy of morality, would be
quite unwilling to help a client rearrange his affairs to reduce taxes. Indeed,
tax planning in private practice is probably not the right career for such a
lawyer. Of course, there is a continuum of ideologies, both with respect to
specific issues and with respect to our tax system in general, and a tax
planner's personal morality could lead her to be conservative or aggressive,
121depending on the particular issue.
Further, a tax planner's perspective on the responsibilities of the
taxpayer and the role of the Service may dictate her willingness to discuss
117 Crystal, Teaching, supra note 91, at 1242; see also Simon, supra note 20, at 30.
118 LUBAN, supra note 20, at 118 ("[W]hen professional and moral obligation conflict,
moral obligation takes precedence"); RHODE, supra note 20, at 58 ("Lawyers can, and
should, act on the basis of their own principled convictions, even when they recognize that
others could in good faith hold different views.").
119 See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 20, at 3, 30-41.
120 Crystal, Teaching, supra note 91, at 1242; David Luban, The Lysistratian
Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, II AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 642 (1986)
(suggesting withdrawal or declining the representation if the lawyer has a moral objection).
12 1 For example, a tax planner who was morally opposed to DOMA might have advised
a same-sex couple married under state law to file using the "married filing jointly" filing
status for federal income tax purposes before Windsor. U.S. v. Windsor, 113 S.Ct. 2675
(2013) (concluding that DOMA was unconstitutional). The tax adviser could have taken this
approach even though, before Windsor, this position lacked substantial authority or a
reasonable basis under federal income tax law; she could have argued that the position was
not frivolous, on the grounds that it was a good faith challenge to the law. Infanti, supra
note 29, at 610.
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audit risk with her client. For example, a moralist tax planner who believes
that taxpayers have a moral duty to comply with the law would likely not be
willing to discuss audit risk with the client, lest the client factor that into the
client's analysis.
Ultimately, tax planners adopting a philosophy of morality may render
very different client advice, depending on the moral perspectives of the
lawyers .122
2. In the U.S. MNC Tax Planning Context
A moralist tax planner's response to the MNC tax planning situation
would depend on the tax planner's perspective on the morality of such tax
planning.
Consider a moralist tax planner who believes that it is morally
repugnant and un-American to shift profits overseas. She agreed with
President Obama, who called inversions "unpatriotic" and "wrong" 123 and
with Senator Charles Grassley, who commented that "these expatriations
aren't illegal, but they're sure immoral. During a war on terrorism, coming
out of a recession, everyone ought to be pulling together."' 24 This lawyer
would not assist at all with any of these U.S. MNC tax planning strategies,
even eschewing those strategies that are clearly legal, fairly-valued, and
where the transactions are not tax-motivated. This lawyer would either
decline to represent the client, or she would do everything in her power to
convince the client that the client should not undertake the inversion,
earnings stripping, or transfer pricing transactions. This lawyer, however,
likely does have a duty to advise the client that these strategies are
available, but she could also advise the client that she is unwilling to assist
with implementing such strategies. If the U.S. MNC client is ultimately
unwilling to refrain from undertaking these tax planning strategies, this
moralist tax planner will likely need to withdraw.
On the other hand, a moralist tax planner who believes that it is
125inappropriate for the U.S. to tax on a worldwide, rather than territorial,
122 See generally Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral
Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389 (2005) (contemplating the possibility that different, but
reasonable, moral perspectives on the same issue, and grappling with what those differences
mean for lawyers seeking to advise clients in manner consistent with the lawyer's moral
perspective).
123 Obama, supra note 56.
124 Joel Slemrod, Tax Minimization and Corporate Responsibility, 96 TAX NOTES 1523
(Sept. 9, 2002); see also Pfizer: Price Gouger, Tax Dodger, AM. FOR TAX FAIRNESS, http://
www.americansfortaxfaimess.org/files/FINAL-2.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
125 See, e.g., The President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and
Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America's Tax System 102-05, 132-35 (2005) (endorsing a
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basis but who believes that U.S. taxpayers have a duty to pay U.S. income
tax on all income earned in the U.S. would assist with the inversion and
with the transfer of assets abroad but would likely be much less willing to
be aggressive with transfer pricing valuations or earnings stripping because
she would want to ensure that the taxpayer is subject to U.S. tax on
"correct" amount of income earned in the U.S. That is, she would help shift
real foreign business operations out of the U.S. tax net, but she would likely
not help with strategies that arguably understate or misprice the amount of
income actually earned in the U.S. For example, she would assist with
allocating to the U.S. entity the amount of debt needed by that entity, but
she would not assist with allocating to the U.S. debt that would be more
appropriately allocated to a foreign parent or foreign subsidiary (and thus,
for which she believes there should be no interest deduction for U.S. tax
purposes). That said, to the extent that the U.S. MNC is paying U.S. tax on
earnings of foreign subsidiaries, this lawyer might be willing to be slightly
more aggressive with earnings stripping and transfer pricing valuations to
"balance out" the U.S. tax that the U.S. MNC is paying in accordance with
worldwide taxation principles. This approach could create "rough justice"
that is aligned with her perspective on the morality of taxation of MNCs -
the U.S. MNC would be subject to U.S. tax, in the aggregate, that equals to
the amount of tax that would be due if the U.S. adopted a territorial tax
system and the MNC was taxed on all of (but no more than) the income
earned in the U.S.
Even further down the ideological spectrum is a strongly anti-tax
moralist tax planner. She would help the client take any and all available
steps to shift income out of the U.S. This would include all of the strategies
that the hired gun would take, and possibly even more aggressive strategies
that are contrary to the existing ethical rules and standards of practice.
C. Tax Lawyer as Ideal Judge
1. In General
A "legalist" approach to lawyering should lead to much less variability
in tax planning advice. Under this approach, "the lawyer should take such
actions as, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case,
seem likely to promote justice," where "justice" is understood to mean
internal legal merit.' 26 The lawyer should "adopt the perspective of an
territorial system).
126 Simon, supra note 17, at 1090, 1096-98 (the lawyer should "assume direct
responsibility for the substantive validity of the decision"); SIMON, supra note 20, at 9-10
(1998); see also Crystal, Teaching, supra note 91, at 1243 (citing Simon); Wendel, Civil
Obedience, supra note 22, at 371-72 (same). Professor Simon also advocates for somewhat
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unbiased, well-informed judge" and should act in accordance with "what a
good-faith interpretation of the legal rule would require in an ideal world
without problems of proof, political bias, or unequal wealth." 127
Under this approach, a tax planner should only assist the client in
taking actions that the tax planner believes are allowed under the best
interpretation of the law and are more likely than not to succeed on the
merits if challenged.128 The legalist lawyer would not defer to the client's
choices if the client wanted to take an aggressive position; she would work
to persuade the client to take the action that the lawyer views as having the
most legal merit and might want to withdraw if she is unable to persuade
the client. Preferably, the legalist tax planner would not take on the
representation of such an aggressive taxpayer. This suggests that the tax
planner should disclose her lawyering philosophy when talking to a
prospective client. Then the client can take the lawyer's legalist perspective
into account when deciding whether to engage the lawyer.
Closely related to the legalist philosophy is the conception of the tax
planner as an "officer of the court."'' 29 Such a tax planner would generally
behave as the legalist tax planner except that she would likely be willing to
advise a client to take more aggressive positions (possibly down to
reasonable basis on non-shelter matters), on the condition that the more
aggressive position is clearly disclosed to the Service.
130
2. In the U.S. MNC Tax Planning Context
The legalist tax planner would help a U.S. MNC undertake those tax
minimization strategies that are more likely than not to be sustained on the
merits if challenged. She would be willing to assist with the planning of an
inversion, particularly if it is not tax-motivated, as long as the inversion
clearly complies with all articulated and foreshadowed guidance, including
the anti-abuse rules. She would not look for complex, technical strategies
to work around the literal language of the limitations on inversions (e.g.,
of a moralist perspective in that he argues that the lawyer should be able to decline to assist a
client in pursuing even lawful strategies that the lawyer believes do not promote justice.
Simon, supra note 17.
127 Ostas, supra note 5, at 516-18.
128 See Wendel, Civil Obedience, supra note 22, at 396-98 (coming to this conclusion
about the application of the legalist philosophy in tax shelters); Beale, supra note 28, at 593
(arguing that "a taxpayer should not be able to take a position on a tax return, nor an advisor
advise a position, unless it is considered to have greater than fifty percent likelihood of
success on the merits if litigated.").
129 See generally Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 39 (1989).
0 See id. at 87-90 (discussing disclosure, and thus a slight subordination of client's
interests, as part of what it could mean for a lawyer to be an "officer of the court").
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she would not help the U.S. MNC "skinny down" at all, even if there is an
interpretation of the existing guidance that would arguably allow for a
"skinnying down" strategy). She would anticipate possible additional
guidance from the IRS (e.g., re: inversions via merger)13' and seek to
comply with what that is likely to be, and in her analysis, she would be
wary of any strategy to which an anti-abuse rule could arguably apply,
helping the client to pursue only those tax minimization strategies that are
highly likely to be compliant with the law. She might assist with
transferring intangibles abroad, but she would only do so at what she
believes are fair (not aggressive) valuations that have factual and legal
merit. She would also be conservative with any earnings/income stripping
transactions to ensure that the client is paying its "correct" amount of taxes.
The legalist tax planner would seek to persuade the client of the merits
of taking more conservative approaches to the U.S. MNC tax planning, and
she would generally not discuss audit risk with the client because audit risk
is irrelevant to the determination of the substantive merits of the tax
planning strategy. However, she might raise audit risk with the client if
audit risk is high and the lawyer wants to try to use that risk to persuade the
client to be more conservative. Ultimately, the legalist tax planner may
need to withdraw if the client wants to pursue more aggressive strategies in
its U.S. MNC tax minimization planning than those with which the lawyer
is willing to assist.
D. The "Authority Conception of Tax Law"
1. In General
Another approach closely related to the legalist philosophy is the
"authority conception of law," pursuant to which the lawyer accepts the law
as a reflection of society's collective moral judgment. That is, the lawyer
does not impose her own sense of morality, nor does the lawyer "treat the
law instrumentally, as an obstacle to furthering the autonomy of their
clients.' 32 Rather, the lawyer "treat[s the law] as an inherently valuable
achievement of a pluralistic democracy"' 133 and ... seek[s] to implement the
'34law as society has agreed upon.
While this approach has been characterized as equivalent to the legalist
'35approach, the authority conception of law arguably allows lawyers more
'' See I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712 (indicating that guidance on these
topics is likely to be forthcoming).
132 Wendel, Civil Obedience, supra note 22, at 366.
133 Id.
134 See id. at 382-85.
135 See Crystal, Teaching, supra note 91, at 1243-44.
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leeway in the context of tax planning. This is because the authority
conception of the law would arguably conceive of both the substantive tax
law and the Circular 230 regulations reflecting standards of practice to
reflect the collective moral judgment of society. That is, tax law contains
substantive rules and meta-rules about how to comply with the substantive
rules. 3 6 The Circular 230 rules articulating standards for tax practice and
the penalty/disclosure thresholds provide guidance about what the relevant
community considers to be "within the range of plausibility."' 37 As a result,
a tax planner adopting an authority conception of the law can understand
the rules regarding penalties and tax standards of practice to provide her
with guidance about what society believes to be the outer bounds of ethical
lawyering.
The authority conception arguably allows the tax planner to advise
clients to take more aggressive positions, and represent more aggressive
clients, than does the legalist approach. For example, a taxpayer may take,
and an adviser may advise clients to take (without the risk of penalty), a
non-shelter position for which there is only substantial authority .138
However, a lawyer adopting an authority conception of law approach is
unlikely to be willing to be as aggressive as a client-centered lawyer serving
136 Professor Wendel does not explicitly reference these meta-rules that articulate
standards of practice for tax practitioners, but he does "call upon lawyers to give effect to the
settlement of the normative controversy that the tax laws represent," explaining that "the
authority conception recognizes that within the range of plausible meanings of a statutory
provision the interpretative attitude taken by lawyers and judges toward statutes and
common law decisions can have a great deal of beneficial or harmful effect on the capacity
of those legal texts to enable collective action." Wendel, Civil Obedience, supra note 22, at
399. He explains that "in order to settle th[e] interpretive question, it seems that some kind of
meta-statute is needed, specifying how statutes should be interpreted" and he believes that "it
must be possible to derive principles of interpretation from the authority conception of legal
ethics itself." Id. at 400. The standards of practice articulated in Circular 230 and the
penalty provisions in the Code provide the type of meta-rules that Professor Wendel desires
because these rules provide guidelines about what society accepts as appropriate ways to
interpret the substantive statute.
137 Professor Wendel explains that the "authority conception would require lawyers not
to take advantage of an interpretation that lies outside the range of plausibility" and notes
that "the meaning of plausible is highly contestable." Id. at 396.
138 I.R.C. §§ 6662(d)(2)(B)(i), 6694(a)(2)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d) (2016)
(Defining "substantial authority" as "an objective standard involving an analysis of the law
and application of the law to relevant facts. The substantial authority standard is less
stringent than the more likely than not standard (the standard that is met when there is a
greater than 50-percent likelihood of the position being upheld), but more stringent than the
reasonable basis standard as defined in §1.6662-3(b)(3)."). There is a somewhat higher
standard for avoiding penalties for reportable transactions and tax shelters. I.R.C. §§
6662(d)(2)(C), 6664(d)(3). Practitioners advising with respect to such transactions should
use this modified standard when understanding what the authority conception of the law
would allow them to advise.
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an aggressive client. A hired gun lawyer may be willing to assist a client in
taking a position that likely subjects the client to a penalty (if, on balance,
the position still has a positive net present value for the client), but a lawyer
adopting an authority conception of the law likely would not. This is
because the threshold at which the law imposes penalties can be
understood, under an authority conception approach, to be the outer limit of
society's collective moral judgment about what interpretations of the law
are within the range of plausibility and are thus ethical.39
2. In the U.S. MNC Tax Planning Context
When advising an aggressive U.S.-parented MNC, a lawyer adopting
the authority conception of law would be willing to be more aggressive than
the legalist lawyer but would be less aggressive than the hired-gun lawyer.
This tax planner would be willing to help a client take MNC tax planning
strategies that are, on balance, not likely to be sustained if challenged, as
long as the positions are supported by substantial authority. The
"substantial authority" threshold (or the "reasonable basis" threshold with
disclosure)1 40 would impose a limit on how aggressive this lawyer is willing
to be when assisting the U.S. MNC.
Although the lawyer who adopts the authority conception of the law
will be willing to be somewhat more aggressive than the legalist lawyer, she
will otherwise behave much like the legalist lawyer. Specifically, she will
(a) impose a limit on client autonomy, in that she will only be willing to
help a client undertake some subset of the arguably allowable tax planning
strategies that the hired gun tax lawyer would use, (b) be unlikely to discuss
audit risk with the client because audit risk is irrelevant when assessing the
likelihood that a position would be sustained on the merits if challenged, 41
and (c) she may need to withdraw if the client is determined to be more
aggressive than she is willing to be.
139 See Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer's Professional Responsibility, 39 U. FLA. L.
REV. 1027, 1059-64 (1987) (discussing the possible characterization of tax law's civil
penalties as establishing a "normative" guideline for taxpayer and tax adviser behavior).
140 The standards for penalties for substantial valuation misstatements are slightly
different than the standards for penalties due to substantial understatements. See I.R.C. §
6662(e). Thus, for the transfer pricing strategies, the lawyer would be willing to assist with
any such strategy that would not trigger penalties.
141 Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (2015) ("The possibility that a return will not be
audited or, if audited, that an item will not be raised on audit, is not relevant in determining
whether the substantial authority standard (or the reasonable basis standard) is satisfied.").
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E. Tax Lawyer as Friend/Counselor
1. In General
A lawyer may view herself as a "friend" 142 or "counselor"'' 43 to her
144client. Her primary guideline would be the needs of the client rather than
the societal conception of propriety. Under the friend/counselor approach,
the lawyer collaborates with the client and provides in-depth counseling in
an effort to help the client make a well-considered decision, taking into
account all relevant factors, including moral considerations. The lawyer-
counselor "weigh[s] all interests and encourage[s] the client to be
thoughtful in making the ultimate decision," and "become[s] actively
involved in the client's affairs and to advise the client in the most general
sense." 145  Moreover, the lawyer-counselor has a "duty to examine the
situation beyond the initial parameters as defined by the client to ensure that
the client's decision was well thought out" and should "advise the client
about these other interests [third party interests], even if the client is not
initially concerned about such issues.' 4 6
The tax planner-counselor takes the client's tax minimization
preferences into account (just as the hired gun does), but she does not
merely accept direction from the client. The friend/counselor raises any
other considerations that the planner thinks ought to be part of the analysis.
For example, when advising an aggressive tax-minimizing client, the
lawyer takes into account the net present value of the tax minimizing
opportunity. However, she also factors in the client's non-tax
consequences, including things like adverse public relations or business
reputation damage that could befall the client as a result of the tax choice. 47
Further, the counselor advises the client to take into account the impact
on others, including on the fisc and on the overall taxing system (e.g., tax
142 See, e.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 20, at 46-50; Thomas L. Shaffer, A
Lesson from Trollope, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 727,734-35 (1978). Cf. Fried, supra note 2
(advocating for a "friend" approach that is very close to the hired gun approach).
143 See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 20; Wilkinson, supra note 96, at 376-78.
144 The "friend" and "counselor" are considered together here because both take a
broader view of client advising in which non-legal considerations are taken into account and
in which the lawyer engages in collaborative conversations with the client about a proposed
course of action.
145 Wilkinson, supra note 96, at 376.
146 Id.; see also, e.g., Morgan, supra note 20, at 445-59 (arguing that a lawyer-
counselor should respect, and help the client achieve, the client's objectives, but should do
so while helping the client respect third party interests and while sharing "the empathy,
respect, and practical wisdom that the lawyer would offer a good friend").
147 This is allowed, but not required, under Model Rule 2.1. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
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morale). As with the philosophy of morality, this can have a strong
ideological component, but unlike the morality approach (in which the
lawyer is the primary decision-maker), the lawyer as friend/counselor
approaches the decision-making process collaboratively; she raises issues
with the client, and discusses the issues in an effort to help the client make
the "right choice." 148
2. In the U.S. MNC Tax Planning Context
If a tax planner were to adopt a friend/counselor approach to advising a
U.S. MNC that wants to undertake aggressive tax planning, the tax planner
would likely be willing to undertake at least some of the aggressive
strategies to inverting, earnings stripping, and transfer pricing discussed
above. However, the friend/counselor lawyer would encourage the client to
consider a variety of non-tax consequences of pursuing aggressive U.S.
MNC tax planning strategies because, with international tax planning for
U.S. MNCs, there is much more at stake than just a tax bill, as we have seen
with other U.S. MNCs that have recently undertaken international tax
planning. These considerations would likely include the strong public
sentiment against expatriations and related tax planning; possible negative
press that the company could receive; the adverse reputational impact with
customers, investors, legislators, and regulators that such press could create;
the company's business identity and concept of corporate social
responsibility that the company pursues; and the possible impact that such
tax planning could have on the client's employees.
Moreover, there is a risk that, as in the Pfizer/Allergan transaction, a
U.S. MNC tax minimization strategy could be aborted after being
announced due to pressure arising from bad press and due to continued
efforts by the Treasury to curtail these transactions.1 49 Aborting the plan
after announcement would mean that the MNC would suffer the adverse
PR/reputational consequences and would have wasted money on tax
planning, all without realizing the anticipated tax savings.
The friend/counselor tax planner would help the MNC take these
considerations into account, which would likely temper, at least to some
degree, the MNC's appetite for aggressive tax minimization. Then, the
lawyer would help the MNC undertake those aspects of the international tax
structuring on which the lawyer and client collaboratively agreed.
148 See, e.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 20, at 3-4, 42-65.
149 See Velarde, supra note 57.
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F. Philosophy of Tax Lawyer Self-Interest
1. In General
Some tax planners seek to promote their own self-interest. This can
result in "defensive lawyering," where the lawyer gives advice and takes
actions that minimize the risk that the lawyer would be subject to
professional discipline, liability for malpractice, loss of fee or other
economic loss, or damage to reputation.' ', 50  A tax planner following a
philosophy of self-interest might be particularly concerned that she might
be subject to penalties. On the other hand, a lawyer Acting in her self-
interest may be willing to be more aggressive if she believes that the
business boon from serving aggressive clients outweighs potential monetary
or professional sanctions she might face as a result of giving overly
aggressive advice. The tax planner trying to make this cost/benefit analysis
might consciously or subconsciously take into account the audit lottery; the
lower the risk that the client will get audited, the lower the risk that the
lawyer will be subjected to sanctions, meaning the more likely that the
business generation benefits of being aggressive outweigh the costs of
being aggressive.
Ultimately, this approach focuses on the lawyer's level of risk aversion
or risk seeking, and this puts the interests of the lawyer ahead of the
interests of the client, which is problematic under the general ethics rules
applicable to all lawyers.
2. In the U.S. MNC Tax Planning Context
A purely self-interested lawyer advising an MNC would follow her
preferences, helping the client pursue whatever tax minimization strategies
would advance the lawyer's interest. Thus, for example, a self-interested
lawyer who wants to build a reputation for aggressive tax minimization and
attract more business from aggressive U.S. MNCs would advocate for an
aggressive approach, tempered possibly by the lawyer's desire to avoid
being personally subjected to penalties or other sanctions.
G. Combined Approaches
The foregoing approaches to lawyering are not the only possibilities.
There are others.'5 '
150 Crystal, Teaching, supra note 91, at 1244-45, 1254.
151 For example, there is also the lawyer as godfather approach. The lawyer may prefer
a "godfather" approach, in which the "client turns the case over to the lawyer; the lawyer
makes the choice he feels will help the client (and the lawyer) win." The lawyer ... make
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In addition, the approaches are not mutually exclusive; they can be
combined. For example, a lawyer might adopt a client-centered approach,
subject to a morality approach in limited situations. That lawyer would act
as a hired gun except in limited situations where she finds the client's
direction to be so morally repugnant that the lawyer feels compelled to
counsel the client to change views or the lawyer decides to withdraw.
152
153There are a variety of combinations, and I suspect that many tax
planners have a philosophy of lawyering that combines multiple
approaches. The friend/counselor approach, in particular, is easily
combinable with the hired gun, legalist, and authority conception
approaches. With any of these combinations, the lawyer would take the
friend/counselor approach as a primary guideline and then use the other
approach to provide the outer limit on how aggressive the lawyer is willing
to be (and why). Thus, if a client, after discussions with the
friend/counselor, wants to pursue a strategy for which there is only
substantial authority, the lawyer who uses a combination of the
friend/counselor and hired gun approaches would likely assist, but the
lawyer who uses a combination of the friend/counselor and legalist
approaches would not.
IV. USING TAX LAWYERING PHILOSOPHIES TO ADVANCE ETHICAL
PRACTICE
As illustrated in Part III, the choice of lawyering philosophy can be
important because sometimes different philosophies will lead a tax planner
to different outcomes. The legalist tax planner may decide not to represent
a client that the hired gun represents. A hired gun lawyer may pursue an
aggressive tax reduction strategy for a client who seeks to minimize tax, but
the lawyer-counselor may raise non-tax considerations with the client to
encourage the client to be more conservative.1 54 The self-interested lawyer
choices in the narrow interest of the [client] and ignoring the interests of others. Lawyer
makes choices based on what he think produces best result for client, and for the client alone.
SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 20, at 3, 5-15. This approach primarily contemplates a
litigation, rather than planning, setting.
152 See Crystal, Teaching, supra note 91, at 1245.
153 Some approaches that seem contradictory can sometimes be reconciled, at least in
certain circumstances. See Wilkinson, supra note 96, at 387-92 (reconciling counselor/hired
gun).
154 George Cooper's article, The Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax
Ethics, and Tax Reform, provides a wonderful illustration about how different philosophies
of lawyering can result in different approaches to the same situation. George Cooper, The
Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax Ethics, and Tax Reform, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1553 (1980). The article compares Mr. Younger, a client-centered hired-gun to Mr.
Senior, who is primarily a legalist. Although the tax laws have changed such the details of
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fearful of penalties levied against her may advise strongly against a position
that is, according to the lawyer following an authority conception of the
law, supported by substantial authority.
Sometimes, however, very different lawyering approaches can lead the
lawyer to give the same advice to a client. For example, consider the self-
interested lawyer who is more worried about monetary and professional
sanctions than she is about attracting business from aggressive clients. She
is likely to advise that clients only take positions that are more likely than
not to succeed on the merits, just like the legalist. And both the hired gun
and the tax planner who adopts an authority conception of the law approach
may be equally willing to assist a client in taking a non-shelter position for
which there is substantial authority.
Although lawyering philosophy does not always change the substance
of the advice that a tax planner gives, lawyering philosophies still matter
because having a philosophy of tax lawyering is a key tool through which a
tax planner can increase the likelihood that she will behave in an ethical
manner, even in the context of aggressive tax planning. This is because a
philosophy of lawyering provides a framework for principled decision-
making, improves the lawyer's ability to discharge her duties to her client,
and empowers the lawyer to pursue a practice that is in accord with her
values.
A. A Framework for Principled Decision-Making
A lawyer who develops her philosophy of lawyering thoughtfully gives
herself a set of guiding principles that she can use when responding to
difficult clients and handling challenging decisions. As a result, she does
not merely "muddle through, developing an ad hoc [approach]" to
discretionary decision-making.' 5 5 Rather, she considers her conception of
an ethical lawyer outside of the context of client pressure and the
competitive market for business. 5 6 This provides her with a framework for
principled decision-making, helping to guide her as to what type of
the conversation would be different today, the perspectives expressed by the competing
lawyers in the article show how dramatically a difference in lawyering philosophy can affect
the advice provided to a client and the relationship the lawyer has with the client.
155 See Crystal, Philosophy, supra note 17, at 93; Crystal, Teaching, supra note 91, at
1240 (explaining that a "philosophy of lawyering" provides "a principle-based approach that
lawyers can use to resolve the wide range of discretionary decisions that they will face
related to the practice of law").
156 See Ethan Burger et al., KPMG and "Abusive" Tax Shelters: Key Ethical
Implications for Legal and Accounting Professionals, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 43, 55 (2007)
(citing former IRS Commissioner Charles 0. Rossotti discussing the challenge tax
professionals face from client and market pressure).
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relationship she wants to have with her client, how aggressive she is willing
to be when assisting clients, what factors she will consider when advising
clients, and what circumstances might lead her to withdraw. Thus, she will
be able to anticipate situations that might push up against her notion of an
ethical tax planner, giving her the ability to consider, outside the context of
client pressure, how she wants to handle those sorts of challenging
157situations.
Drawing these lines thoughtfully and prospectively will give her a
deeper understanding and greater conviction about why these lines are the
right lines to guide her practice. This perspective and strength will help
make her more likely to be able to hold the lines that she wants to hold even
in the face of significant external pressure, thereby increasing the likelihood
that she will avoid decisions made in the heat of the moment that are
contrary to her concept of an ethical tax planner. 58 This is, in part, because
having an articulated "professional identity"'' 59 provides the lawyer with an
internal "sense of self," which increases the likelihood that she will make
discretionary decisions in a way that respects her lawyering philosophy in
order to obtain "identity benefits" and avoid "identity costs."'
' 60
157 Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1107, 1157-64 (2013) (recommending that, in order to overcome behavioral factors that
lead to ethical lapses, lawyers should among other things "reflect regularly on core values"
and "try to anticipate ethical dilemmas and to specifically plan and rehearse our responses
ahead of time").
"' Id. at 1117-18, n. 59 (explaining that decisions made in the heat of the moment can
lead to ethical lapses); see also E. SCoTr FRUEHWALD, DEVELOPING YOUR PROFESSIONAL
IDENTITY, CREATING YOUR INNER LAWYER 36-38 (2015) (connecting identity and values to
the ability to exercise "practical wisdom").
159 This notion of "[p]rofessional identity is, in essence, the individual's answer to
questions such as, Who am I as a member of this profession? What am I like, and what do I
want to be like in my professional role? And what place do ethical-social values have in my
core sense of professional identity?" WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION
OF LAW 135 (2007) [hereinafter "CARNEGIE REPORT"]; see also, e.g., Martin J. Katz,
Teaching Professional Identity in Law School, 42 COLO. LAW. 45 (2013) ("Professional
identity is the way a lawyer understands his or her role relative to all of the stakeholders in
the legal system, including clients, courts, opposing parties and counsel, the firm, and even
the legal system itself (or society as a whole)."). It can be challenging for students and junior
lawyers to develop this sense of self, and law schools have been encouraged to do more to
assist students with this. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra, at 14 (the "third apprenticeship"
involves professional identity formation); see also Heather M. Field, Fostering Ethical
Professional Identity in Tax: Using the Traditional Tax Classroom, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L.
(forthcoming 2017) (arguing that professors should foster professional identity development
of students in traditional tax classrooms, and providing exercises for doing so).
160 See Claire A. Hill, The Law & Economics of Identity, 32 QUEEN'S L.J. 389, 395,
399-405 (2007).
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Of course, a tax planner's lawyering approach may evolve over time.
Indeed, "tax practitioners should constantly be asking themselves these
questions [about the appropriate role of the tax planner]."16 There are "no
easy answers,"' 62 but a tax planner who is deliberate and careful about how
she conceives of her role, even as that thinking may evolve, helps herself to
differentiate between legitimate tax planning with which she will assist and
abusive tax planning with which she will not,163 and helps herself to make
difficult decisions in a principled way.
B. Discharging Duties to Clients Effectively
Employing a philosophy of lawyering can help a tax planner serve her
clients more effectively. This is because a lawyering philosophy defines
the lawyer's role and can guide both what a particular tax planner's loyalty
to a client entails and how the tax planner will discharge that duty of
loyalty.
By clarifying the lawyer's role and approach, a philosophy of
lawyering can help set and meet client expectations about the
representation. If the lawyer can explain to clients how she approaches the
tax planning process and if she can understand what the client wants out of
the lawyer-client relationship, she can better identify clients whose needs
she is most likely to be able to meet. Where the lawyer's philosophy is
markedly different from the client's preferences, the lawyer may want to
decline the representation; at the very least, the lawyer should advise the
client about the mismatch. 164 Additionally, a tax planner who identifies her
lawyering approach and discusses it with her client can help set client
expectations for the representation and can help the client understand how
to be a better consumer of her legal services, which in turn increases the
likelihood that the client will be satisfied with the advice provided.
In addition, the choice of lawyering approach can affect how much the
client trusts the lawyer and can affect the nature of the interaction that the
client has with the lawyer during the course of the representation. 6' The
choice of lawyering approach affects the lawyer-client relationship,
including the client's opinion of the lawyer, the client's perception about
161 Jackel, supra note 9, at 79.
162 id.
163 See Wendel, Civil Obedience, supra note 22, at 399; Slemrod, supra note 124
(noting that how far "creative compliance" ... "is pushed depends on an attitude, measured
in units of aggressiveness").
164 See Crystal, Philosophy, supra note 17, at 93 (recommending that bar require
statement of philosophy of lawyering and notification to clients about a lawyer's approach).
165 See, e.g., Pepper, Amoral, supra note 20, at 1601-07 (discussing the client
experience with different types of lawyers).
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whether the tax system is treating her fairly, the client's willingness to hire
the lawyer for particular types of matters in the future, and the likelihood
that the client will recommend the lawyer to others. A client surely cares,
for example, whether his lawyer is motivated by the lawyer's desire to
protect the lawyer or by the lawyer's desire to ensure that the client
complies with the law, even if the substantive advice would be the same.
Similarly, a client's experience with a hired gun is likely to be quite
different from the client's experience with a counselor, even if the lawyer's
ultimate advice is the same under both approaches. This is not to say that
the client experience is better under one approach or another; which
experience is better depends on the client, the matter, and the lawyer.
Client satisfaction with the representation does not depends solely on the
action that the client ultimately takes based on the advice. Client
satisfaction and whether a lawyer has effectively met a client's needs also
depend on the nature of the lawyer/client interaction, and thus, on the tax
planner's philosophy of lawyering.
C. Practicing in Accordance with One's Values
Having a philosophy of lawyering also helps the lawyer maintain her
"personal integrity [and] inner moral compass," thereby helping her to
avoid decisions that she is likely to regret and helping her to stay true to the
166type of lawyer she wants to be.
Because a philosophy of lawyering helps a lawyer practice in a way
that reflects her values, it can empower the tax planner to more effectively
withstand and counter external criticism for involvement in tax reduction
planning. Being able to articulate her rationale for approaching tax
planning as she does helps to form her identity as a lawyer167 and can also
empower her to educate critics about what it means to behave with integrity
as a tax planner. Moreover, practicing in a setting' 68 and in a way that is in
166 Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV.
527,530 (1994); see also AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT - AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM:
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP
204 (1992) (citing "a lawyer's personal sense of morality" as an important guide and
identifying "promoting justice, fairness, and morality in one's own daily practice" and a
fundamental value of the profession); SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 20, at 1-2 (prefacing
the book's discussion of lawyering philosophies by posing questions about the morality of
lawyers).
167 See Claire A. Hill, Tax Lawyers Are People Too, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1065, 1066-67
(2007) (discussing the importance of identity).
168 Lawyers may feel obligated to proceed in accord with the philosophy of their firms,
rather than in accord with their own philosophies. See infra Part VI.A.1. However, if an
associate has a strong sense about her philosophy of lawyering, she can make a well-
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accord with her personal values may contribute to the tax planner's sense
that she is doing something worthwhile with her time and expertise, which
builds self-worth and which may ultimately make the practice of tax law a
more sustainable and personally satisfying career.'
69
D. Lawyering Philosophy Is Not a Silver Bullet
Of course, having a philosophy of lawyering does not guarantee that a
lawyer, particularly when assisting with potentially aggressive tax planning,
will meet the ethical ideal. This is for at least three reasons.
First, some may believe that one model of lawyering is the only way to
behave ethically. Such an individual would conclude that a tax planner who
adopts a different (and potentially more aggressive) philosophy of
lawyering would not be advising appropriately. However, given the lack of
consensus among commentators about which model of lawyering is
"correct," this article takes a more inclusive approach and offers several
different philosophies of tax planning, each of which (except the purely
self-interested approach) can be the foundation for ethical practice. This
article's approach will leave unsatisfied the commentator who believes
there is only one right approach to ethical lawyering. That commentator
can continue to try to persuade all of us of the rightness of her approach, but
until there is consensus about the right model for ethical practice within the
boundaries of the existing rules, each individual practitioner must determine
what ethical practice means to her. Then, she can use that philosophy to
guide her actions and help her to discharge her duties to her clients in a way
that is consistent with her understanding of what it means to be an ethical
tax planning practitioner. With this inclusive approach, a key challenge
facing each individual lawyer is identifying which philosophy most
considered decision about whether to go to work for a firm that adopts a different
philosophy.
169 Lawrence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal
Satisfaction: Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, II CLINICAL L. REV. 425
(2005) (arguing that practicing with integrity contributes to happiness and wellness, and
citing research connecting values and happiness); Lawrence S. Krieger & Kennon M.
Sheldon, What Makes Lawyers Happy?: A Data-Driven Prescription to Redefine
Professional Success, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 617-18 (2015) (practicing in accordance
with one's values and being driven by internal motivations are correlated with greater
happiness and well-being); Benjamin V. Madison III & Larry 0. Natt Gantt II, The Emperor
Has No Clothes, But Does Anyone Really Care? How Law Schools Are Failing to Develop
Students' Professional Identity and Practical Judgment, 27 REGENT U. L. REV. 339, 343,
348-50 (2014-15) (connecting lawyering philosophy and professional identity to "the degree
of fulfillment a lawyer finds in practice"); Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy,
and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 871 (1999) (connecting ethical practice to health and happiness).
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resonates with her. Only then can she develop guidelines to help her with
difficult discretionary decisions, such as when advising a potentially very
aggressive U.S. MNC.
Second, even if everyone agreed on one "right" approach to ethical tax
planning, implementation of that philosophy of lawyering would remain a
challenge. In any situation involving difficult discretionary decisions, there
is no guarantee of making the "right" decision, even if one has a strong
framework for principled decision-making. This is because humans are
fallible and because even the best practitioners will be faced with various
institutional and social impediments to good decision-making; there will be
cognitive biases and other internal and external factors that influence the
decisions that are made by even those with the best judgment. Thus, a tax
planner who has identified her philosophy of lawyering may not meet her
ethical ideals because of impediments to her ability to implement her
philosophy of lawyering effectively.
Third, in difficult circumstances, a tax planner may choose to
compromise her values and proceed in a way that is contrary to her
philosophy of lawyering. 170
The third challenge is not something with which this article can
meaningfully assist, but the next two parts of this article address the first
two challenges listed above. Part V discusses selection of a philosophy of
lawyering for tax planners and offers some insight into considerations that
might lead a tax planner to opt for one model rather than another. Part VI
discusses how to cope with barriers to effective implementation of one's
chosen philosophy of lawyering.
V. SELECTING A LAWYERING PHILOSOPHY FOR TAX PLANNING
The identification of one's philosophy of tax lawyering is a very
personal process, and philosophies of lawyering will vary from lawyer to
lawyer. Scholars continue to debate in extensive literature about which
lawyering approach is "right."''7 Considerations include the nature of the
170 Even if she does so, there is still value in having a philosophy of lawyering because
it helps to prevent inadvertent compromise. If compromising oneself, this choice should be
deliberate rather than inadvertent, and the lawyer should understand, and decide to accept,
the consequences of compromise.
171 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. One way to think more broadly about the
choice of lawyering philosophy is suggested by Professors Thomas Shaffer and Robert
Cochran, who frame the choice of philosophy as one that depends on what the lawyer wants
for his client-"client victory, client autonomy, client rectitude, [or] client goodness"-
which will then dictate whether the lawyer or the client controls the representation and
whether any interests other than the client's are taken into account. SHAFFER & COCHRAN,
supra note 20, at 3.
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relationship between the lawyer and client, the relevance of values, the
relationship of the lawyer to the system that created the law, and the impact
of human nature, among other issues.
Query whether one or more approaches are particularly appropriate or
inappropriate in the context of a lawyer who engages in tax planning. This
section addresses that question by analyzing issues unique to tax planning
that might affect the tax planner's selection of a lawyering philosophy.
Considerations specific to tax planning include limited enforcement
resources and the reliance on taxpayer self-assessment, the notion of a "duty
to the revenue system," the prospective planning context, whether a
transaction is primarily tax-motivated, and the public perception of the tax
system and tax lawyers. Each, and its potential impact on a tax planner's
choice of lawyering philosophy, will be discussed in turn.
A. Government/Taxpayer Resource Imbalance, Weak Enforcement &
Reliance on Taxpayer Self-Assessment
Our tax system suffers from an insufficiency of government
172enforcement resources . Lack of resources leads to a relatively weak
enforcement mechanism for the tax system, 73 which means that (a) the
government cannot be presumed to be a reliable adversary to all taxpayers
who may take aggressive positions, and (b) the tax system relies heavily on
self-assessment and taxpayers' willingness to comply with the law.174
These concerns may suggest conservatism among tax advisers. Thus,
some commentators argue that a legalist approach is appropriate for tax
planning advice.' 75  This is because in the absence of an effective
172 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOC., Annual Report to Congress 2014, at 12-15, http://tax
payeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2014-Annual-Report/Volume-One.pdf
(discussing declining IRS resources in comparison to the IRS workload).
173 For example, only approximately 0.7 percent of all 2014 tax returns were audited by
the IRS. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 2015 DATA BOOK, at 21, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/15databk.pdf. And the government enforcement mechanism for the tax system is not
backstopped by private rights of action, as enforcement is in other areas such as securities
regulation and environmental regulation.
'74 See Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. I 1,
142-44 (2009) (discussing the self-assessment system).
175 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 28, at 593 (arguing that the ethical rules should tax
planning should be subject to a MLTN standard); Rachelle Holmes Perkins, The Tax Lawyer
as Gatekeeper, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 185, 210 (2010) (arguing that tax lawyers should
serve as gatekeepers imposing a MLTN standard); Richard Lavoie, Am I My Brother's
Keeper? A Tax Law Perspective on the Challenge of Balancing Gatekeeping Obligations
and Zealous Advocacy in the Legal Profession, 44 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 813, 827 (2013) (self-
assessment system means that "goal of reporting the correct tax should also be the guiding
principle for the tax adviser").
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counterparty to challenge aggressive positions and ensure that the tax is
assessed in compliance with the law, the lawyer cannot act in a purely
partisan way, advocating for anything that is arguably legal for her client to
do. Rather, given that she knows that there is unlikely to be a challenge to
the position, she must temper that zealousness in order to help ensure that
her client is, on balance, more likely than not to be complying with the tax
laws, lest she enable a client to get away with under-reporting or under-
payment.
A legalist approach might be further limited by combining it with a
moralist approach on the grounds that "the less reliable the procedures and
institutions, the more direct responsibility [the lawyer] needs to assume for
substantive justice. ' 76 With this approach, not only would the lawyer work
to ensure that the taxpayer's positions are more likely than not to succeed
on the merits, the lawyer would also limit her assistance to clients taking
positions that she believes reflect good tax law (or at least the tax law as
Congress intended it to be).
However, taking a conservative approach because of the
government/taxpayer resource imbalance does not necessarily require a
legalist approach. Rather, it may mean adopting a lawyer-as-counselor
approach and highlighting for the client the resource imbalance and the
importance of compliance. Further, the lawyer-as-counselor could
encourage the client to be more conservative both because of the tax
system's reliance on self-assessment and because of the impact that overly
aggressive approaches may have on revenue collection, the ability of
government to function effectively, and the public's perception of fairness
177of the tax system. This friend/counselor approach does not ensure that a
taxpayer advised by the particular lawyer is more likely than not to be
complying with the tax laws, but it could reduce the need for IRS
enforcement actions because it may enable a lawyer to influence clients to
be more likely to take positions with the most substantive merit.
Alternatively, the government resource concern may lead a tax planner
to take an officer-of-the-court approach or to adopt an authority-conception
176 SIMON, supra note 20, at 140. A related concern relates to problems within our
democratic system, and particularly with our tax law/regulation writing process. See
Schizer, supra note 28, at 338-39 (discussing the mismatch between the government and the
private sector). This concern has been used to support arguments that that our laws may not
be good enough to allow lawyers to act as hired gun or even to use an authority conception
of the law; rather lawyers need to take a more conservative, justice-promoting approach such
as a legalist or possibly moralist. On the other hand, others argue that the lawyer should be
deferential to the choices and actions legislators and regulators, and not overlay the lawyer's
own views on the law; this perspective supports a hired gun or authority conception
approach.
177 See e.g., Lavoie, supra note 175, at 826-28, 856-58.
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philosophy. Under these approaches, the tax planner would advise
disclosure for any position less certain than more-likely-than-not, or at least
for any position that lacks substantial authority. These approaches do not
reduce the need for government enforcement, but by highlighting for the
IRS positions that the IRS might want to investigate, these approaches may
enable more efficient use of limited IRS enforcement resources. This
arguably "levels the playing field" between the taxpayer and the IRS .178
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the tax planner may conclude that the
resource concern ought not to dictate her selection of a philosophy of
lawyering. She may conclude that her actions are sufficient as long as she
does not factor in the IRS's limited enforcement ability when advising a
client to take a particular position (i.e., by not advising a client to take
position based on the likelihood of audit). By not taking advantage of the
client/government resource imbalance, she arguably fulfills her
responsibility to "act[] fairly and with integrity in practice before the
IRS,' 179 even if she takes a hired gun approach to her role as a tax planner.
B. Duty to the Revenue System
A related, but somewhat broader, concept that might influence a
practitioner's choice of lawyering philosophy is the notion that tax lawyers
have a special duty to the revenue system. Whether such a duty exists has
long been the subject of debate. Some argue that tax lawyers have duties to
"protect the revenue"' 80 and to the "laws and system of administration that
comprise our nation's revenue raising process" and thus "must balance the
immediate demands of their clients against the public's interest in a sound
tax system which operates in accord with policy judgments reached through
a democratic process."' 8 ' These commentators argue that this duty is
derived in part from the resource imbalance and self-assessment
considerations discussed above, but it is broader in that some proponents of
such a duty argue that it also comes in part from "the special nature of the
government as an opponent,"' 18 and from a sense of reciprocity toward the
183
system that facilitates the lawyer's livelihood. That is, the "tax
178 Crystal, Teaching, supra note 91, at 1243 (citing William Simon's work).
179 Circular 230 § 10.34(a)(4) (2014).
'80 Durst, supra note 139, at 1051.
1s Linda Galler, The Tax Lawyer's Duty to the System, 16 VA. TAX REV. 681,688,693
(1997); see also, e.g., GALLER & LANG, supra note 15, at 3-4 (2010); WOLFMAN, supra note
15, at 1-2; Beale, supra note 28, at 639.
182 Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 28, at 2726; see also, Schizer, supra note 28, at
338.
183 See, e.g., William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional
Responsibility of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453 (2007).
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practitioner ethics play an important role in the government's ability to
collect taxes efficiently, and therefore, play an important role in helping pay
for a civilized society and in upholding the democratic social consensus
embodied in the tax system."' 84 Others counter that tax lawyers have no
special duty to the tax system beyond the general duty to "obey and uphold
the law" and that if the tax lawyer adheres to the rules of law and ethics,
there is "no separate duty owed either to the tax system or to society."'
' 85
Among other reasons, this is because of the potential impact that a duty to
the system would have on the lawyer/client relationship.'
86
A lawyer who believes that the "tax lawyers' duty to uphold the law is
comparable to their duty toward clients" would likely adopt a legalist
approach to tax planning, advising clients to take positions only if they are
more likely than not to succeed. 87 Or perhaps such a tax lawyer might take
an even more restrictive approach - as a moralist, bounded by a legalist
approach. That is, helping clients take a position that the lawyer believes
both reflects a morally appropriate tax rule for our revenue system and is
more likely than not to succeed on the merits.
On the other hand, a tax lawyer could conclude that the penalty
provisions set forth the normative boundary for establishing her duty to the
system,' 88 such that she meets that duty if she employs an authority
conception of the law approach. Or perhaps, a lawyer could conclude that
her duty to system is really about "contribut[ing] to improvement of the tax
laws and administration," meaning that she discharges this duty through
work other than client service, such as by commenting on the law and
making recommendations for improvements. 89 In this case, she might
adopt an authority conception approach or the even (possibly) more
aggressive hired-gun approach for her work representing clients.' 90
Alternatively, a tax lawyer may be unpersuaded that she owes a special
duty to the revenue system, in which case she would use other
considerations to help guide her in identifying her lawyering philosophy.
184 Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 28, at 2722-23.
185 Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers, Ethical Obligations, and the Duty to the System,
47 U. KAN. L. REV. 847, 851 (1999).
186 See, e.g., id. at 848; David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to Clients and Duties
to Others-The Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the Acceptance of a Duty
to the System, 63 TAx LAW. 169,170 (2009).
187 Beale, supra note 28, at 639; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 28, at 2743
(advocating for a MLTN threshold except in limited cases); Perkins, supra note 175, at 229
(advocating for gatekeeper role at MLTN threshold).
188 See Durst, supra note 139, at 1059-64.
189 Corneel, supra note 27, at 301.
190 Id. at 312-13.
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C. Prospective Planning Context
A lawyer's choice of lawyering philosophy may also be influenced by
the role that she serves when representing clients.' 9' A tax planner provides
prospective advice and has the opportunity to help shape the relevant
transactions. In contrast, a litigator becomes involved after the relevant
transactions have occurred and must do her best with the facts she is given.
As a result, some commentators have argued that a hired gun approach,
which may be appropriate for a lawyer serving in a litigation or advocacy
role, may be less appropriate for a lawyer serving as a planner or adviser.'
92
They argue that tax planning is not truly adversarial, and thus, a
transactional lawyer should serve as a gatekeeper, limiting client access to
those benefits that are "more likely than not" to be compliant with the
law. 193 This argument may be particularly compelling when coupled with
the weak enforcement mechanism provided by the taxing system.
194
On the other hand, client autonomy, which is the central focus of the
hired gun approach, is an important value to advance regardless of whether
it is exercised in a prospective planning context or in a retrospective
litigation posture. Indeed, the tax policy norm of neutrality' 95 would
suggest that the tax laws should distort business decisions as little as
possible, and if a client believes that its business goals would be furthered
by undertaking a particular transaction, then a hired gun approach - taking
direction from the client and helping the client to plan that transaction that
the client believes is warranted - would advance autonomy and possibly
efficiency. This may be socially beneficial even if the transaction is tax
minimizing and even if the tax consequences are not likely to be sustained
on the merits if challenged.
D. Primarily Tax-Motivated Transactions
Different lawyering approaches may also be warranted depending on
whether the client's primary goal is the pursuit of non-tax business
objectives or merely tax minimization.' 96 "[T]he advisor role [could be
191 The model rules distinguish between roles. MODEL RULES, supra note 18, at
preamble par. 2. See also Schwartz, supra note 20, at 678-95 (arguing for different
professionalism norms to apply to the nonadvocate lawyer).
192 See, e.g., WOLFMAN , supra note 15, at 3; Beale, supra note 28, at 632-33; Ostas,
supra note 5, at 518-20.
193 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 28, at 632-33; Lavoie, supra note 175, at 828.
194 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 20, at 678-95 (distinguishing counseling vs.
advocacy context, given lack of counterparty).
195 JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 131-34 (4th ed. 2008).
196 See Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Real Ethics: A Critique of ABA
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subdivided] into two categories: (1) advice on how best from a tax
standpoint to carry out a non-tax motivated transaction that the client has
already determined to pursue, and (2) advice on how to save taxes as an end
in itself, without any particular transactional objectives in mind., 197
A tax planner should arguably be particularly cautious of taking a hired
gun approach in the latter situation because there is greater risk of crossing
the line. The absence of non-tax economic business objectives for the
transactions means that there is little meaningful constraint, other the
lawyer's good character, on the "artful construction of transactions" and
"whatever [illegitimate tax manipulations one] can get away with." 198
On the other hand, perhaps even when advising on tax-motivated
transactions, the philosophy need not be different as long as the lawyer is
executing the philosophy rigorously. That is, even the hired gun approach
requires the lawyer to make an assessment of the position's likelihood of
success on the merits. That assessment is likely to differ based on what
kind of planning the client is pursuing. The economic substance doctrine,
among other anti-abuse doctrines, makes it less likely that a purely tax-
motivated position will succeed. If the planner's assessment accurately
takes account of the additional risk of the tax-motivated position, 199 then the
planner arguably should not feel compelled to adopt a more conservative
philosophy for a tax-motivated transaction than she would for a non-tax
motivated transaction with the same likelihood of success on the merits.
E. Public Perception of Tax Lawyers & the Tax System
A tax practitioner's lawyering philosophy may also be influenced by
the extent to which she is concerned about the historic role of tax lawyers in
sheltering and evasion,20 0 the decline in professionalism of the tax bar,2 °1
202 . 203the erosion of public confidence in the tax system, anti-tax rhetoric,
and the development of a broader "culture of tax avoidance" among
204taxpayers and their advisers . If she wants to try to be an agent of culture
change from within the tax system in response to one or more of these
Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 643,645-46 (1986).
197 Cooper, supra note 154, at 1581.
198 Id. at 1582.
'99 This, of course, can be difficult to do. See infra Part VI.
200 See generally Rostain, supra note 6, at 88-94; ROSTAIN & REGAN, supra note 6.
201 See, e.g., Infanti, supra note 29.
202 See Dzienkoski & Peroni, supra note 28, at 2735-36, 2739.
203 See Michael Hatfield, Tax Lawyers, Tax Defiance, and the Ethics of Casual
Conversation, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 841,844-51 (2011).
204 See Henry Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, 55 ST. Louis L.J. 47, 53 (2010)
(discussing convergence between the cultures of tax avoidance and tax evasion).
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concerns, she may opt for a more conservative approach, such as a legalist
approach, rather than a hired-gun approach. Or she might embrace a
moralist or friend/counselor role, trying to educate clients about these
concerns in an effort to encourage them to take conservative positions that
reflect greater social responsibility 2 5 and that embody a culture of tax
compliance instead of avoidance. On the other hand, she may determine
that the way she personally represents clients ought not to be affected by
these concerns and that to the extent that she wants to help counteract these
issues, it is better to do so through system-wide initiatives, such as efforts to
raise the standards of practice applicable to all practitioners.
F. A Personal Choice
None of these considerations is dispositive, and different factors may
resonate more strongly with some practitioners than with others. My
personal approach, as reflected in prior work, is that the tax planner should
provide "informative and understandable advice that comprehensively
addresses the client's objectives (including tax objectives) and gives the
client an appreciation of the benefits and risks of a decision, thereby putting
,,206the client in a position to make an educated choice. That is, I take a view
that combines the counseling and hired gun approaches.
Despite my personal view, I believe that all of the philosophies of
lawyering discussed above (except for the purely self-interested approach)
are plausible approaches for tax planners. Each tax planner must decide for
herself what lawyering approach is most aligned with her values.
VI. IMPLEMENTING A PHILOSOPHY OF TAX LAWYERING
To be an ethical tax lawyer, it is not enough to understand the relevant
ethics rules and have a lawyering philosophy. The tax planner must be able
to implement her approach to lawyering. Otherwise, having a lawyering
philosophy cannot serve as an effective tool to help advance ethical
practice. Implementation of a lawyering philosophy depends on the tax
planner's ability to exercise independent, unbiased professional judgment,
particularly as to the substantive merits of a particular tax position.
This is true regardless of a tax planner's philosophy. The lawyer who
adopts an authority conception of the law is only willing to advise on
positions that are strong enough not to subject the client to penalties. Thus,
205 See Dzienkoski & Peroni, supra note 28, at 2735 (explaining that notions of
corporate social responsibility "include good faith compliance with the tax laws"); Roxanne
Bland, Aggressive Tax Planning and Corporate Social Responsibility, 81 ST. TAX NOTEs 877
(Sept. 12, 2016).
206 Field, supra note 112, at 1299 n.l.
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she must be able to determine which positions are more likely than not to
succeed (for tax shelters and reportable transactions), which positions have
substantial authority, and which have a reasonable basis. The self-
interested lawyer, friend/counselor, legalist, and hired gun must be able to
make these same determinations, though each for a different reason.
Inability to make these judgment calls effectively can cause a tax
planner to cross a line she did not intend to cross. Indeed, I suspect that
some tax planners, such as the attorneys from Jenkins & Gilchrist (who
famously brought down their entire firm by giving overly aggressive tax
planning advice), thought they were acting as hired gun tax planners, but
because of flaws in their judgment about the strength of particular tax
positions, ended up - perhaps unwittingly - crossing lines that they did
not want to cross.
Of course, the exercise of professional judgment is a skill that is
developed over the course of a career, but there are systematic ways in
which people err. Although I suspect that every tax planner believes that
she exercises solid professional judgment, that may be product of a blind
spot.2°7 Tax advisors are unlikely to be immune from the systematic ways
in which people make mistakes or (consciously or subconsciously) act
dishonestly. "The reality is that important decisions made by intelligent,
responsible people with the best information and intentions are sometimes
hopelessly flawed. 2 °8
Thus, this section draws on insights into the realities of tax practice and
on social science literature about flawed decision-making in order to
identify a few ways in which tax planners are likely to err when exercising
their professional judgment. This section discusses a few major
impediments to the successful implementation of a philosophy of
lawyering, and then discusses strategies for overcoming these impediments
in order to help a lawyer stay true to her lawyering philosophy-and thus to
her values -in practice.
A. Impediments to Implementation - Biases from Institutions, Clients, &
Self
Any factor that can bias a lawyer's independent judgment can prevent
207 See, e.g., Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring
Behavior: The Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 565 (2007) ("People see themselves as less susceptible to bias than others.");
Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 157, at 1116-18 (discussing ethical blindspots); Irene
Scopelliti et al., Bias Blind Spot: Structure, Measurement, and Consequences, 61 MGMT.
Sci. 2468 (2015).
208 Andrew Campbell et al., Why Good Leaders Make Bad Decisions, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Feb. 2009, at 6.
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her from adhering to her lawyering philosophy and can thus lead to
unethical behavior. This section focuses on three major impediments to
effective implementation of a lawyering philosophy: institutional influences
(i.e., law firm, other practice setting, professional community, and social
community), the influences wielded by clients, and cognitive biases. This
section briefly describes how each can affect a tax planner's ability to
exercise unbiased judgment, especially in ways that could lead a lawyer to
be more aggressive than her lawyering philosophy would dictate or in ways
that could lead the lawyer to conclude that a position is stronger than she
would otherwise assess it to be.
These influences could also lead a lawyer to be more conservative than
she otherwise would be, but the focus here is on factors that could lead to
more aggressive advising because it is when a lawyer is more aggressive
than she would otherwise be that she risks crossing ethical lines.209 Note
that the factors described herein are not the only influences that can
adversely impact a lawyer's ability to implement her lawyering philosophy
effectively, and the below is not an all-inclusive discussion of this complex
and nuanced topic. Further, these factors affect lawyerly decision-making
for many types of lawyers, not just tax advisers, and thus, the discussions
are rarely tax-specific. However, this section is intended to highlight
important factors that could impede a tax planner from using her lawyering
philosophy to help her be ethical while advising on potentially aggressive
matters.
1. Institutional Influences on Decision-Making
Ample literature documents that organizations and communities of
which a person is a part can wield significant influence over the person's
individual decision-making and over the decision-making of groups in
which the person participates. These institutional influences can affect
lawyers across disciplines and tax planners in particular. This section will
discuss three key institutions that can skew a tax adviser's ability to
exercise independent judgment when advising a client: the lawyer's firm or
other practice setting, the lawyer's professional community outside of the
firm, and the lawyer's social community.
a. Firm or Other Practice Setting
A tax planner's practice .setting is "among the most powerful,
209 Perhaps an influence that leads a lawyer to be more conservative than she would
otherwise be could also be problematic, for example, for a moralist lawyer who is pressured
to do something that contradicts her principles because it is more likely to succeed on the
merits than the approach that aligns with her principles.
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contextual factors shaping enactments of professionalism" and is thus likely
to have significant influence over the decisions that the individual tax
planner makes.2 1°
This influence on the exercise of judgment can be explicit or implicit.
Firms often set explicit monetary or other incentives for particular behavior
such as bringing in clients, and firms establish guidelines for career
advancement. The firm's influence can also be more subtle in that the firm
has a particular identity or culture about the way it approaches client
211advising and representation. Junior lawyers, in particular, can be
212influenced by these cultural norms because more senior lawyers who
practice in accordance with these norms serve as mentors and team
members. These more senior lawyers within the firm model
professionalism, and working with these senior lawyers can be a formative
experience in shaping a junior lawyer's inchoate professional values.213
A planner's judgment may be skewed by these incentives and
influences. She may consciously or subconsciously take these guidelines
214into account when determining how to advise a client. The desire to
bring in business, keep one's job, earn bonuses, and gain respect within the
firm can be extremely powerful, particularly in the current era of tight job
markets for junior lawyers and enormous law school debt. These
considerations can easily lead a lawyer to be more aggressive than she
wants to be or to conclude that a position is stronger than she would have
otherwise judged it to be. Certainly, none of this is unique to tax planning,
210 Douglas N. Frenkel et al., Introduction: Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of
Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 704 (1998); see also MICHAEL J.
KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE 19 (1994);
Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665 (1994); Patrick J.
Schiltz, Attorney Well-Being in Large Law Firms: Choices Facing Young Lawyers, 52
VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999).
211 Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 157, at 1146-48, 1166-67 ("The ethical culture
of a firm, company, agency, or practice group is an important determinant of how ethically
the attorneys within that entity will behave.").
212 See Victor Fleischer, Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, and Corporate Culture, 26
VA. TAX REV. 1031, 1046, 1050-51 (2007) (discussing the potential impact of corporate
culture on employee behavior).
213 See id.; Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, It's Hard to Be a Human Being and a
Lawyer: Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice,
105 W.VA. L. REV. 495 (2003); Tanina Rostain, Waking Up from Uneasy Dreams:
Professional Context, Discretionary Judgment, and the Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV.
955, 964-66 (1999) (discussing conformist behavior particularly in "ethically ambiguous
situations").
214 See Francesca Gino et al., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior: The
Effect of One Bad Apple on the Barrel, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393 (2009) ("[I1ndividuals'
ethicality ... depends on the social norms implied by the dishonesty.of others.").
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but firm/practice setting culture215 has been an important factor in enabling
the tax shelter industry to flourish.21 6
b. Professional Community
A lawyer's larger professional community outside her particular
practice environment can also influence her ability to exercise unbiased
independent judgment. This is because lawyers often engage with their
peers in practice outside of their firm by conversing with opposing counsel,
attending conferences and CLE programs, and reading publications
authored by members of that larger community. These interactions, during
which participants often discuss new laws and regulations and strategies in
response to those new developments, expose a lawyer to professional norms
within the community. And these interactions inform a lawyer about the
"currencies" that are valued within the professional community, such as
number, size and types of clients represented, profits per partner, creativity
in devising tax minimization strategies, and frequency of success with
aggressive positions.
Although the larger professional community does not wield as much
direct control over a lawyer's future as does her own firm, the professional
community establishes norms that help her understand what
professionalism means within her field,2 17 and that could inform her firm's
norms about approaches to client representation, both of which could skew
218her ability to exercise independent judgment. Further, to the extent that
the lawyer might want to move to another firm or get referrals from other
firms, her reputation within, and ability to meet the norms of, this larger
professional community can affect her career success. These indirect
influences can inform and may skew a lawyer's independent judgment.
215 This discussion generally references lawyers at firms, but the influence of practice
setting is equally powerful in other practice settings. See, e.g., Susan Cleary Morse, The
How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 961, 964-74 (2006) (discussing the impact of organizational tax compliance norms
within a public corporation).
216 RoSTAIN & REGAN, supra note 6; see also Pollack & Soled, supra note 6 (blaming
the allure of money as partially explaining the "bad behavior" of tax professionals).
217 Information gleaned from these interactions can suggest that others behave more
aggressively than they actually do, and thus, potentially encouraging us to mimic that
approach and be more aggressive than is warranted. See generally Bert I. Huang, Shallow
Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2227 (2013) (discussing situation where one party's actions
might appear to be illegal but have a critical feature, hidden from view, that allows the
action, and where another party takes the first party's actions as a signal about how to
behave).
218 ERICH KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR 64-70 (2007)
(discussing the impact of social norms on tax compliance behavior).
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These influences may be particularly powerful in the tax advising
context, in part because the tax bar has a recent history of having two
distinct groups: the regular tax bar and the tax shelter bar. 219 While this
distinction may have waned since the heyday of shelters and given the
arguable convergence between the groups, 220 there remains a subset of tax
professionals that embrace a more aggressive approach.22 Being part of the
more aggressive segment of the tax professional community can affect a
lawyer's baseline for judging which positions are arguably legal. Further,
even within the "regular" tax bar, some commentators have argued that
there is a professional norm that "celebrates" innovative tax minimization
222
strategies, which can create subtle pressure on a lawyer to conclude that a
position is stronger than it really is.
c. Social Community
Similarly, a tax adviser's social community (i.e., outside of the firm
and outside of the professional community) can also impact the adviser's
judgment because of cultural norms within that larger community. Tax
advisers may encounter casual conversations in which friends and
acquaintances articulate views about the tax system; 3 this is particularly
common once the friends and acquaintances know what the tax adviser does
for a living. These conversations, and even offhand remarks by those in the
tax adviser's social community, inform the tax adviser about the attitudes
toward taxation within the lay community of which the lawyer is a part,
thereby creating social norms. A tax adviser might internalize those
attitudes and unintentionally take them into account when carrying out her
job, as part of seeking approval (or avoiding social sanctions) within her
224
social community.
219 Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form and
Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV.
47, 55-57 (2001); see also Joseph Bankman, The Business Purpose Doctrine and the
Sociology of Tax, 54 SMU L. REV. 149, 150 (2001); cf. Wendel, Professionalism as
Interpretation, supra note 22, at 1215 n.168 ("Nancy Staudt suggested in conversation that
this informal sociology of the profession may not be entirely accurate.").
220 Ordower, supra note 204, at 111-25 (discussing convergence between the cultures
of tax avoidance and tax evasion).
221 Id. at 87-94 (discussing the role of the tax bar in tax planning trends).
222 Beale, supra note 28, at 595-99.
223 See Hatfield, supra note 203, at 844-51 (discussing anti-tax rhetoric that tax lawyers
may encounter in casual conversations).
224 KIRCHLER, supra note 218, at 64-70 (discussing the influence of social norms on
behavior); see also, e.g., James Aim, Testing Behavioral Public Economics Theories in the
Laboratory, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 635,646-47 (2010) (discussing literature regarding the impact
of social norms on tax compliance).
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This influence can subtly push in favor of a more aggressive or more
conservative approach, depending on the particular social circle. This
influence. on lawyerly decision-making, however, is likely to be less
powerful than the influence of the firm or the professional community.
Nevertheless, norms within a tax adviser's social community, along with
broader societal norms about taxpaying ,25 still have the potential to skew a
lawyer's ability to exercise unbiased judgment as part of implementing her
lawyering philosophy.
2. The Impact of Clients
Clients can wield significant influence over a lawyer's ability to
exercise the unbiased independent judgment required to effectively
226implement the lawyer's philosophy of lawyering.
Even without any pressure from the client, the mere fact that an
individual represents a particular client can make her biased in favor of the
227client's interests. And although some clients are truly looking for
unbiased advice from counsel, many clients often have specific expectations
228or desires about the outcome of the advice. Thus, the lawyer is
pressured, either overtly or out of a desire to please the client, to reach the
outcome that the client wants.2 29 This can have a powerful impact on a
lawyer's ability to exercise independent judgment, particularly given
competitive market pressures to keep clients happy, get additional referrals,
and bring in more business.230  Moreover, advisers tend to identify more
225 KIRCHLER, supra note 218, at 70-7 1.
226 See, e.g., Burger, supra note 156, at 55; Devos, supra note 24, at 177 (reviewing
studies about the impact of client risk orientation on tax adviser behavior); Jackel, supra note
9, at 77-78 (competitive market pressures). This is true both at the individual-client level
and at the aggregate level. That is, not only can an individual client influence how a lawyer
makes decisions in a particular situation, but repeated representation of a particular set of
clients with similar objectives and perspectives can also color a lawyer's overall approach to
the particular field of law. See, e.g., Robert Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional
Autonomy, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1985).
227 See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARV.
Bus. REV., Nov. 2002 (discussing role-conferred bias among auditors).
228 See Peggy A. Hite & Gary A. McGill, An Examination of Taxpayer Preference for
Aggressive Tax Advice, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 389 (1992).
229 See, e.g., Bazerman, supra note 227 (arguing that service providers "have strong
business reasons to remain in clients' good graces and are thus highly motivated to [reach
the outcome the client desires]"); Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law
Firm Practitioners, 41 Hous. L. REV. 309, 337 (2004); Lin Mei Tan & Valerie Braithwaite,
Agreement with Tax Practitioners' Advice Under Tax Law Ambiguity, 17 N.Z. J. TAX. L. &
POL'Y 267, 285 (2011) (reporting on a study finding that aggressive advice can be demand-
driven by aggressive taxpayers).
230 See, e.g., Kay J. Newberry et al., An Examination of Tax Practitioner Decisions: The
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closely with their clients over time, thereby increasing the extent to which
their judgment reflects what the client wants it to be.231 Thus, continued
representation can skew judgment toward client-favorable outcomes, even
if the client does not exert explicit pressure.
Also, a client might have a very different concept of how it envisions
the nature of lawyer/client relationship than does the lawyer. A client who
wants a hired gun lawyer may be unhappy with a lawyer who takes a
moralist, legalist, or friend/counselor approach. This lawyer might be well-
advised to withdraw from the representation particularly if it involves
aggressive positions or positions that the lawyer believes are unwise or
morally dubious. As long as the lawyer is representing the client, however,
the lawyer may be influenced to change her approach to lawyering to satisfy
the client, which means changing whether and/or how she assists with
transactions on which she would otherwise not choose to assist or that she
would otherwise handle differently.
3. Cognitive Biases & Behavioral Factors
Rich social science literature discusses cognitive biases and other
232behavioral factors that affect decision-making and the exercise of
judgment, and research demonstrates that taxpayers are subject to these
biases.233 But tax advisers are also likely to be susceptible to these biases,
meaning that they can affect a tax adviser's ability to exercise unbiased
independent judgment in accordance with her lawyering philosophy.234
This impact can occur in many ways. For example, the self-serving
bias235 and the tendency "to be overconfident in or about our abilities and
Role of Preparer Sanctions and Framing Effects Associated with Client Condition, 14 J.
ECON. PSYCHOL. 439 (1993).
231 See Brian Spilker et al., Client Advocacy in the Global Economy: A Comparison of
U.S. and Indian Tax Professionals,14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 439 (1993); David Mason & Linda
Garrett Levy, The Use of the Latent Constructs Method in Behavioral Accounting Research:
The Measurement of Client Advocacy, 13 ADVANCES TAX. 123 (2001).
232 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH & HAPPINESS (2009).
233 KIRCHLER, supra note 218, at 129-51 (surveying the behavioral economics
literature, particularly as applied to taxpayer behavior).
234 Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 157; JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R.
STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS (2012) (providing insights into the challenges of
acting in accordance with one's professional and personal values); see also Alice Woolley &
W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics & Moral Character, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1065, 1069-
75 (2010) (discussing how psychological factors can influence ethical decision-making
among lawyers).
235 See, e.g., Bazerman, supra note 227.
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prospects" 236 can lead a tax adviser to overestimate the likelihood of success
of an argument or position that she has devised. Confirmation bias237 and
bias toward the status quo238 can lead a lawyer to reach the same result in a
new matter without adequately analyzing the details of the new matter to
ensure that the result really should be the same as in the prior matter.
Difficulty in perceiving the importance and cumulative impact of small
changes 239 can lead a tax adviser to conclude that a new position has the
same likelihood of success as an earlier position even though several small
changes have been made and even though the tax adviser would not have
assessed the new position to be as strong had the tax adviser examined the
new position in isolation. The tendency to discount future events24° can
cause a tax adviser to inadvertently take the audit lottery into account,
meaning that she may overvalue tax savings today as compared to potential
costs in the future, overestimate the likelihood of success of a position,
and/or underestimate the potential costs of an audit in the future. Loss
aversion 24 (for both the client and the lawyer) can cause an individual to be
more risk-seeking when facing a potential net "loss," as some view taxes to
242 243be. And fatigue, to which many lawyers are subject due to the
demands of practice, can make it harder to make good decisions and resist
the organizational and client influences discussed above. These are just a
handful of the ways in which cognitive biases and behavioral factors can
impact a lawyer's judgment and decisions, her ability to stay true to her
desired lawyering philosophy, and her ability to hold ethical lines.
B. Planning to Counteract Decision-Making Biases
Although there may be many impediments to a tax planner's ability to
236 Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 157, at 1116-17 (discussing overconfidence as
contributing to ethical blindspots, and citing research regarding overconfidence).
237 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).
238 Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and
Status Quo Bias, 5 J. EcON. PERSP. 193, 197-99 (1991).
239 Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 157, at 1118-19 (discussing, and citing other
work regarding, the psychology of slippery slopes).
240 David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON. 443
(1997).
241 Kahneman, supra note 238, at 199-203.
242 James Alm & Carolyn J. Bourdeaux, Applying Behavioral Economics to the Public
Sector, 206 REV. PUB. ECON. 91,107 (2013).
243 See, e.g., Nicole L. Mead et al., Too Tired to Tell the Truth: Self-Control Resource
Depletion and Dishonesty, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 594 (2009) (concluding that




exercise independent judgment and to thus implement her lawyering
philosophy, the risk of impediments to implementation should not prevent a
tax lawyer who is seeking to behave ethically when assisting with
potentially aggressive tax planning from using a lawyering philosophy to
guide her. The impediments described above can be mitigated.
Acknowledging that there are threats to one's ability to exercise
unbiased judgment is a critical first step in overcoming them. 244 If a tax
planner is sensitive to the ways that biases can affect her exercise of
independent judgment, she gives herself the opportunity to counteract the
effects of those biases. Understanding and planning for the biases can help
increase the quality of the tax planner's judgment. In turn, this increases
the likelihood that the tax planner will serve her client to the best of her
abilities, will implement her philosophy of lawyering effectively, and will
fulfill her vision of being an ethical tax planner.
Strategies for counteracting impediments to ethical and unbiased
decision-making are many and varied. A comprehensive plan for
counteracting these biases is beyond the scope of this article, but this
section highlights some approaches to consider.
1. Be Explicit
Being explicit about one's lawyering philosophy can increase the
salience of guidelines for ethical decision-making.245 This means a tax
planner should explicitly identify her lawyering philosophy, the lawyering
philosophy of her firm/practice setting, and the lawyering philosophy of the
professional community with which she regularly engages. This means
246openly discussing lawyering approaches with colleagues. The tax adviser
should also explicitly discuss her lawyering philosophy with prospective
clients at or before the beginning of the representation; this enables the tax
adviser to understand what the client is seeking from the representation, to
be clear with the client about what she will and will not do, and to
determine whether the client's perspective (and likely influence) is aligned
with the lawyer's preferred approach.
244 Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 157, at 1156-57 (encouraging individuals and
firms to "recognize their susceptibility to bounded ethicality and to have an awareness of the
factors that can influence ethical decision-making" and to "take affirmative steps to
minimize the likelihood that they will behave unethically").
245 Id. at 1158-59.
246 See, e.g., Corneel, supra note 27 (providing a sample statement of a firm's
guidelines to practice, which reflect a firm-level lawyering philosophy); Robbennolt &
Stemlight, supra note 157, at 1168-71; Linda K. Trevino et al., Behavioral Ethics in




A tax adviser should try to choose employers, matters, and clients
carefully, taking her lawyering philosophy into account. This means
selecting a practice setting that is as likely as possible to embrace a
lawyering philosophy that is consistent with the tax adviser's preferred
approach, and this means considering whether to try to find a new
supervisor or new job if the lawyer discovers that differences between her
approach to lawyering and her supervisor's or firm's are skewing (or are
247threatening to skew) her judgment. Further, choosing wisely means
being willing to decline to represent a client or to withdraw from a
representation if client pressure is adversely affecting her ability to exercise
independent judgment.
3. Create Reliable Processes
Reliable processes can also help a tax adviser implement her lawyering
philosophy. Examples include (a) having an otherwise uninvolved
colleague (perhaps a designated ethics counsel) 248 review the analysis,
particularly for aggressive or difficult determinations; (b) having a
colleague assigned to play the role of the IRS as the analysis is undertaken,
and (c) having a policy against making final determinations late in the
evening when she is more likely to be fatigued.
4. Beware of Red Flags
There are many red flags that should lead a lawyer to pause and
reconsider whether she is upholding the standards to which she subscribes.
A tax adviser should be attuned to phrases or sentiments such as "just this
once," "the [other] firm did it," "if we don't, the client will fire us," "that's
what we concluded last time, and this is pretty similar," and "it's so close,
maybe it doesn't really make a difference." These red flags do not mean
that a lawyer is doing (or about to do) something unethical, but each should
heighten the lawyer's awareness of the risk that she could be crossing the
line into an action that violates her lawyering philosophy. By using these
red flags as triggers to reconsider the analysis before proceeding, she may
247 This is not always possible to do, in which case, the lawyer must devise strategies
for resisting the influence on her judgment while remaining in the situation for as long as is
necessary.
248 Kimberly Kirkland, Ethical Infrastructures and De Facto Ethical Norms at Work in
Large US Law Firms: The Role of Ethics Counsel, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 181 (2008); see also
Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 28, at 2751 (discussing firm-level strategies for ensuring
ethical behavior).
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be able to avoid unintentional lapses in judgment.
5. Reflect Regularly
Professional growth requires an iterative process of reflection and
response. Thus, it is important for a practitioner to set aside time regularly
to reflect on whether she is making the discretionary decisions in a way that
furthers her lawyering philosophy, whether she might make different
choices if faced with the same decision again, and if so, how she can learn
from the prior situation and make responsive changes that strengthen her
ability to adhere to her lawyering philosophy. Perhaps small changes to
firm processes and client conversations are sufficient, but perhaps more
dramatic changes-to her practice specialty or practice setting-are
warranted in order to enable her to build a tax planning career that aligns
with her values.
She should also reflect on whether her experiences change her
perspective on the type of tax adviser she wants to be. Lawyering
philosophies may evolve over time, so it is important to continue to reflect
on whether a choice made in the past about guiding principles for practice
continue to reflect the lawyer's vision of the ethical tax planner she wants to
be.
6. Cope with the Realities of Practice
Admittedly, the foregoing can be challenging given the realities of law
practice, particularly for junior attorneys. Lack of expertise and seniority
may make it hard to create changes within a firm if the lawyer finds herself
practicing in a way that is contrary to her lawyering philosophy, and a tight
job market and student debt may make it difficult for her to find a new job
that better matches her lawyering approach. Responses to these situations
may vary, but mentors (both in and outside the lawyer's organization) who
share the lawyer's approach to lawyering can help her devise strategies for
overcoming or at least mitigating the ethical mismatches she experiences .24 9
VII. CONCLUSION
So can an ethical tax practitioner be an aggressive tax planner?
It depends on the practitioner. The rules of professional responsibility
and tax-specific standards of practice allow practitioners to assist with
aggressive tax planning. But, within the boundaries set by those rules and
standards, each individual practitioner must determine what ethical tax
249 I discuss such strategies in greater detail in a separate article. Field, supra note 159,
at Part IV.C.2.ii.
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practice means to her and what kind of tax planner she wants to be. Then
she can determine whether and to what extent facilitating aggressive tax
planning fits with her vision of ethical practice. She should use that vision
to guide her through those difficult discretionary decisions as she tries to
build a defensible, morally-coherent tax planning career of which she can
be proud.
